From Backpacks to BlackBerries: (Re)Examining New Jersey v. T.L.O. in the Age of the Cell Phone by Sprung, A. James
Emory Law Journal 
Volume 61 Issue 1 
2011 
From Backpacks to BlackBerries: (Re)Examining New Jersey v. 
T.L.O. in the Age of the Cell Phone 
A. James Sprung 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj 
Recommended Citation 
A. J. Sprung, From Backpacks to BlackBerries: (Re)Examining New Jersey v. T.L.O. in the Age of the Cell 
Phone, 61 Emory L. J. 111 (2011). 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol61/iss1/3 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Law Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu. 
SPUNG GALLEYSFINAL 11/1/2011 1:10 PM 
 
FROM BACKPACKS TO BLACKBERRIES: (RE)EXAMINING 
NEW JERSEY V. T.L.O. IN THE AGE OF THE CELL PHONE† 
ABSTRACT 
When the U.S. Supreme Court decided New Jersey v. T.L.O., cellular 
phones had yet to emerge in American society and public schools. 
Contemplating a world of physical possessions and tangible objects, the 
T.L.O. Court determined that public school students may expect only a 
minimal amount of privacy in their backpacks, purses, and other belongings 
while at school. The Court used these diminished privacy expectations to 
establish a heavily reduced standard of Fourth Amendment protection against 
unreasonable searches conducted by teachers and administrators. 
The pervasiveness of cell phones in today’s schools, however, has arguably 
swayed the balance. As students, like the rest of society, increasingly rely on 
their cell phones for a vast range of private purposes, they have demanded a 
reevaluation of the heavily abridged safeguards the T.L.O. Court prescribed. 
Calls for heightened Fourth Amendment protection in students’ cell phones 
arise in an era when school authorities often search the stored contents on 
these phones (including call histories, text messages, photos, and information 
accessed on the Internet) in the name of maintaining an orderly educational 
environment. The mounting uncertainty over the privacy students can expect in 
their cell phones against school officials’ intrusions has left schools vulnerable 
to widespread opposition and rights-based litigation. Students often reflexively 
believe that they should have more privacy rights in their cell phones than the 
established standard provides. This Comment develops a legal argument that 
lends support to this intuition. 
With an eye toward respecting students’ heightened expectations of privacy 
in their cell phones, this Comment advances the novel argument that the 
capabilities, characteristics, and uses of these devices have confounded the 
justification for reduced Fourth Amendment standards upon which the T.L.O. 
Court relied. First, the capabilities of cell phones and the uses to which 
students put them demand the recognition of heightened privacy expectations 
in these devices. Moreover, the complexity of cell phones increases the degree 
 
 † This Comment received the 2011 Mary Laura “Chee” Davis Award for Writing Excellence. 
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of intrusion students are forced to accept upon any search of their contents, 
reaffirming the need for greater safeguards to respect students’ privacy 
interests. Finally, school officials do not have a sufficient interest to justify 
these extensive intrusions upon students’ heightened expectations of privacy 
without more protective Fourth Amendment safeguards in place. In light of 
these deficiencies, this Comment proposes a number of heightened measures, 
including the reinstatement of probable cause and the requirement of parental 
notice and consent, that may feasibly be implemented in the school 
environment to better protect students’ privacy rights in a new frontier of the 
Fourth Amendment’s application to public schools. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Writing in 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court could not have conceived of the 
characteristics and capabilities of cellular phones when it diminished the 
standard of Fourth Amendment protection public school students could expect 
in their belongings. In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court abrogated the Fourth 
Amendment’s typical requirement that a government official obtain a warrant 
justified by probable cause before engaging in a search of an individual’s 
person or belongings, holding instead that a public school official need only 
“reasonable suspicion” to justify an intrusion into a student’s purse or 
backpack.1 The Court’s reasoning, however, contemplates a bygone era that 
predated the ubiquity of increasingly sophisticated cell phones in the school 
environment. 
The tremendous features and functions of these devices—and the personal 
and extensive uses to which students put them—have arguably confounded the 
balance T.L.O. struck between students’ privacy expectations and school 
officials’ disciplinary needs. The emergence of the cell phone has accordingly 
given rise to calls for heightened safeguards to protect students’ (and their 
families’) Fourth Amendment rights in their phones against a T.L.O. standard 
that may inadequately reflect these interests.2 Moreover, as students balk at the 
low safeguards, school officials face legal uncertainty (and potential liability) 
in a crucial, modern area of school authority.3 The need to clarify a heightened 
standard is particularly pressing in light of public schools’ needs to respond to 
a number of cell-phone-related issues, including the troubling modern 
phenomenon of “cyberbullying,” an umbrella term encompassing a host of 
methods by which students harm each other emotionally and relationally 
through their cell phones and other electronic devices.4 
 
 1 469 U.S. 325, 339–45 (1985). 
 2 See, e.g., Katherine Leal Unmuth, Phone Search by High School Angers Parent, DALL. MORNING 
NEWS, Aug. 2, 2010, at B1; Suzanne Ito, Pa. School District Pays $33,000 to Settle Cell Phone Search 
Lawsuit, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS (Sept. 17, 2010, 3:34 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/pa-school-
district-pays-33000-settle-cell-phone-search-lawsuit; Tara Parker-Pope, Should Schools Search Cellphones?, 
N.Y. TIMES WELL BLOG (July 6, 2010, 10:25 AM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/06/should-schools-
search-cellphones/; Jake Whittenberg, Schools’ Anti-Bullying Plan Includes Cell Phone Search, KING5.COM 
(Aug. 23, 2010, 5:39 PM), http://www.king5.com/news/education/New-anti-bullying-plan-includes-cell-
phone-search-101313244.html. 
 3 See, e.g., Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622, 639–41 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (finding 
that a school administrator’s search of a student’s cell phone violated the Fourth Amendment); Ito, supra note 
2 (discussing a lawsuit brought on behalf of a student alleging a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights 
after school administrators confiscated and searched her cell phone). 
 4 See discussion infra Part I.B. 
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This Comment develops the argument that the distinctive characteristics of 
students’ cell phones necessitate a reexamination of the standard, to this point 
governed by T.L.O., guiding public school officials’ searches through the 
contents of these devices.5 While courts and scholars have just begun to 
explore the privacy implications of cell phones in other Fourth Amendment 
contexts, the question has yet to be scrutinized under the T.L.O. framework and 
in the public school context. In anticipation of the debate, this Comment 
presents a case for students’ rights in an era when technology has strained the 
established legal structure, arguing that students’ privacy expectations in their 
cell phones demand greater protection than T.L.O. provides. 
Part I of this Comment describes the prevalent use of cell phones among 
students and in the public school environment, explains school officials’ 
corresponding need to search these devices’ contents, and provides a model 
scenario to illustrate the problem. In Part II, this Comment surveys the legal 
landscape governing school searches and notes a growing body of case law 
expounding on the issue of cell phone searches by law enforcement authorities 
in other areas of Fourth Amendment doctrine. 
Part III advances the argument that the pervasiveness of cell phones upsets 
the careful balance struck by the T.L.O. Court between students’ privacy 
expectations and school officials’ interests, which the Court used to justify a 
reduced standard of protection under the Fourth Amendment. A renewed 
examination of students’ privacy interests in their cell phones demonstrates 
that school officials should observe heightened safeguards before searching 
these devices. Part IV of this Comment then suggests safeguards that could 
feasibly be implemented in the public school environment. 
I. THE PRESENCE AND PROBLEMS OF CELL PHONES IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
This Comment’s argument addresses a specific and increasingly common 
situation facing school administrators: a search through the contents of a 
student’s cell phone based on some degree of suspicion that the student has 
violated school rules or criminal law. This Part first establishes the prevalence 
of cell phones in public schools, then explains the problems associated with 
 
 5 This Comment’s scope is limited to public primary and secondary schools in the United States, and it 
does not address searches by school officials in public institutions of higher education, such as colleges or 
universities. For a discussion of students’ Fourth Amendment rights in public higher education, see generally 5 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.11(d), at 531–38 
(4th ed. 2004). 
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this phenomenon and the reasons school officials have for searching the 
contents of these devices, and finally outlines a model situation facing teachers 
and administrators. 
A. The Uses and Ubiquity of Cell Phones in Schools 
Without a doubt, students’ cell phones pervade the public school setting. 
According to a 2010 study conducted by the Pew Internet & American Life 
Project, 75% of American teenagers between the ages of twelve and seventeen 
carry cell phones, a figure that increased from 45% in 2004.6 Inevitably, these 
cell phones find their way inside school walls, regardless of schools’ attempts 
to prohibit them.7 More than three-fourths of teenagers bring their cell phones 
to school, despite that 86% of teenagers report that their schools have banned 
the devices from classrooms during school hours.8 Moreover, students use their 
cell phones frequently during the school day. Fully half of students reported 
sending or receiving text messages during class at least several times per 
week.9 
As cell phones have become the norm in schools, their capabilities and 
features have continued to evolve. Cell phones, as traditionally defined, are 
small, mobile telephones capable of communicating with other phones via 
conventional vocal interactions or text messages and often function as cameras 
that can produce and store digital pictures or videos.10 The Internet provides 
additional methods of communication. Internet users can send messages and 
files to each other via electronic mail (known almost universally as e-mail); 
can post messages, pictures, and videos on social networking sites such as 
Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube;11 and can engage in instant-message 
 
 6 Amanda Lenhart et al., Teens and Mobile Phones, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT 2, 16 (Apr. 20, 
2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2010/PIP-Teens-and-Mobile-2010-with-topline.pdf. 
 7 For a discussion of school policies banning cell phones and the effects of these bans on students’ 
privacy rights, see infra Part III.A.3. 
 8 Lenhart et al., supra note 6, at 82. 
 9 Id. at 84. “Text messaging” allows cell phone users to communicate with one another by transmitting 
short written messages, or text messages, between devices. Katharine M. O’Connor, Note, :o OMG They 
Searched My Txts: Unraveling the Search and Seizure of Text Messages, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 685, 688. 
 10 SAMEER HINDUJA & JUSTIN W. PATCHIN, BULLYING BEYOND THE SCHOOLYARD: PREVENTING AND 
RESPONDING TO CYBERBULLYING 8, 19 (2009). 
 11 This Comment does not address the information or material students place on the publicly accessible 
areas of their social networking profiles. For example, personal Facebook websites include a “wall” onto 
which text and photos can be placed for anyone visiting that particular site (typically a student’s 
acquaintances) to read or view. See FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/facebook (last visited Sept. 13, 
2011). These public postings are quite different from text messages, e-mails, phone calls, or other forms of 
more private communication available through cell phones, and these postings may not be protected by the 
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conversations (allowing contemporaneous, text-based communication) through 
a variety of websites.12 Until recently, these Internet-based forms of 
communication and file sharing were accessible exclusively through personal 
computers. The increasing sophistication of cell phone technology, however, 
has allowed many—if not most—cell phones on the market to access the 
Internet via high-speed connections and provide massive storage space for 
high-quality pictures, videos, or music.13 These highly sophisticated cell 
phones, often referred to as “smartphones,” constitute an enormous and ever-
increasing share of the cell phone market in the United States.14 Modern cell 
phones, even so-called standard cell phones,15 have essentially allowed 
 
Fourth Amendment at all. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”); 
United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225–26 (D.P.R. 2002) (finding no expectation of privacy, a 
prerequisite for Fourth Amendment protection, in information made widely available to others on the Internet), 
vacated per curiam on other grounds, 90 F. App’x 3 (1st Cir. 2004). For a more detailed discussion of 
individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights in their social networking websites, see generally David Hector Montes, 
Note, Living Our Lives Online: The Privacy Implications of Social Networking, 5 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. 
SOC’Y 507 (2010). 
 12 See HINDUJA & PATCHIN, supra note 10, at 19; BARBARA C. TROLLEY & CONSTANCE HANEL, CYBER 
KIDS, CYBER BULLYING, CYBER BALANCE 40 (2010). 
 13 Apple’s iPhone 4, HTC’s myTouch 4G Slide, and BlackBerry’s Torch models—all among the newest 
models of smartphones available on the market as of September 2011—connect to the Internet using high-
speed connections and store at least four gigabytes of information with an option to upgrade to thirty-two 
gigabytes, a capacity easily encompassing thousands of text messages, photos, videos, music files, and other 
applications or information. See BlackBerry Torch 9850 Specs & Torch 9860 Specs, BLACKBERRY, 
http://us.blackberry.com/smartphones/blackberry-torch-9850-9860/#!phone-specifications (last visited Sept. 
13, 2011); iPhone 4, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone/features/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2011); T-Mobile 
myTouch 4G Slide, HTC, http://www.htc.com/us/products/mytouch4gslide-tmobile?view=1-1&sort=0#tech-
specs (last visited Sept. 13, 2011). 
 14 In the third quarter of 2010, more than 20 million smartphones were sold in the United States. See 
Nick Bilton, The Race to Dominate the Smartphone Market, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Nov. 1, 2010, 3:26 PM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/01/apple-and-google-excel-in-u-s-smartphone-growth/. That number 
was an increase from approximately 14.5 million in the previous quarter and 9.7 million in the second quarter 
of 2009. See Matt Hamblen, OS War Has Android on Top in U.S. Smartphone Sales, COMPUTERWORLD (Aug. 
12, 2010, 3:47 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9180624/OS_war_has_Android_on_top_in_ 
U.S._smartphone_sales. As of mid-2011, there were approximately 82 million smartphones in circulation in 
the United States. Ellen Gibson, Mobile Shopping: More Buzz than Buy So Far, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 1, 
2011, 3:56 AM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2016074590_apusmobileshopping 
standstill.html. 
 15 Because smartphones and standard cell phones now possess many of the same functions and 
capabilities, the Ohio Supreme Court (for example) has refused to draw an analytical distinction between them 
in evaluating the privacy interests in cell phones generally. See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954 (Ohio 
2009) (noting that even standard cell phones can “store and transfer data and allow users to connect to the 
Internet”). Similarly, this Comment will refer to cell phones as a collective category rather than distinguish 
between smartphones and standard cell phones. 
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students to carry to school “portable microcomputers” with all the salient 
characteristics of a personal computer.16 
It is these sophisticated devices that students are increasingly carrying with 
them into schools. Studies have indicated that cell phone users, including 
students, use their phones to communicate with others via the Internet, seek 
online information, produce and store photographs or videos, shop, bank, 
create documents, store medical records, or search for information regarding 
personal or political interests.17 A large majority of students use their cell 
phones to create and store images, and 54% use their phones to record and 
store videos.18 Moreover, 31% of students use their cell phones for instant 
messaging on the Internet, 21% access their e-mail accounts through their cell 
phones, and nearly one-fourth use their cell phones to access their own and 
others’ accounts on social networking sites.19 
Cell phones with sophisticated characteristics and capabilities are prevalent 
among students inside school walls. The pervasiveness of these devices, 
however, has given rise to new concerns for teachers and administrators as 
they seek to investigate disputes or accusations and maintain order in the 
school environment. 
B. The Rise of Content Searches by School Officials: Cyberbullying and Other 
Harms 
As cell phones have become a predominant mode of interaction between 
students and have the capacity to store the evidence of so many aspects of a 
student’s daily life, school officials often see the need to search the contents of 
these devices in investigating accusations, suspicions, or disputes.20 One of the 
primary social problems giving rise to the need to search a cell phone’s content 
is the phenomenon of cyberbullying.21 In the public school context, 
 
 16 See Bryan Andrew Stillwagon, Note, Bringing an End to Warrantless Cell Phone Searches, 42 GA. L. 
REV. 1165, 1171–72 (2008) (quoting Adriana de Souza e Silva, Interfaces of Hybrid Spaces, in THE CELL 
PHONE READER 19, 19 (Anandam Kavoori & Noah Arceneaux eds., 2006)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 17 See Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical 
Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1572–75 (2004) 
(citing studies indicating the uses of Internet access through phones). 
 18 Lenhart et al., supra note 6, at 56. 
 19 Id. 
 20 See Marc Freeman, New Warnings on Technology Set in Schools, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, 
Fla.), Aug. 31, 2011, at 1B; Unmuth, supra note 2; Parker-Pope, supra note 2; Whittenberg, supra note 2. 
 21 See, e.g., Sharon Salyer, Mukilteo Schools May Check Students’ Cell Phones, HERALDNET (Jan. 24, 
2011), http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20110124/NEWS01/701249945; Whittenberg, supra note 2. 
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cyberbullying involves students “being cruel to others by sending or posting 
harmful material or engaging in other forms of social cruelty using the Internet 
or other digital technologies, such as cell phones.”22 Cyberbullying may take a 
variety of forms. For example, cyberbullying may involve heated text-message 
exchanges that lead to threats or physical violence.23 It may also take the form 
of ongoing insults through posts, calls, e-mails, or text messages directed at a 
single victim.24 Other instances of cyberbullying have involved impersonation, 
where one student takes another’s cell phone and sends harmful messages or 
images to others while acting as the cell phone’s owner.25 Cyberbullying may 
even include “cyberstalking,” or often-anonymous onslaughts of 
communications directed at someone through text messages, phone calls, or e-
mails.26 
One peculiar use of cell phones and other personal electronic devices 
known as “sexting” deserves brief description as a frequent mechanism of 
cyberbullying. Sexting refers to the “transmission of sexually charged 
materials” (typically photos) between students through text messages or other 
forms of file transmission,27 usually in the context of a romantic relationship.28 
Sexting often becomes a vehicle for cyberbullying, as many students who 
receive “sexts” eventually forward these photos or messages to other 
unintended recipients out of either intrigue or spite, leading to wide 
dissemination of extremely private material and the humiliation of the original 
sender.29 These incidents are not isolated. Nineteen percent of teenagers have 
sent a nude or seminude image to someone via text message or e-mail, and 
 
 22 NANCY E. WILLARD, CYBER-SAFE KIDS, CYBER-SAVVY TEENS 10 (2007). Notably, Willard’s 2007 
conception of cyberbullying assumes Internet communications to be an alternative to cell phone 
communications. The emergence of cell phones incorporating Internet access, however, has blurred the 
distinction Willard makes, allowing students to access Internet communication options through their cell 
phones. See supra notes 11–16 and accompanying text. 
 23 See NANCY E. WILLARD, CYBERBULLYING AND CYBERTHREATS 5–6 (2007). 
 24 See id. at 6–7. 
 25 See id. at 8. 
 26 See id. at 10. 
 27 Dawn Zinga, Boundaries in Cyber-Space: Media and Stakeholders as Policy Shapers, in TRUTHS AND 
MYTHS OF CYBER-BULLYING 105, 113 (Shaheen Shariff & Andrew H. Churchill eds., 2010). 
 28 See WILLARD, supra note 22, at 9–10. 
 29 See id. at 9. Cyberbullying involving this kind of material has led to tragedy in some cases. For 
example, eighteen-year-old Jessica Logan, a public school student, took a nude photograph of herself using her 
cell phone and sent the image to her then-boyfriend. Cindy Kranz, Family Wants Tougher Laws: Sexting 
Suicide, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 22, 2009, at A1. Upon splitting up, the student who received the image 
sent it to several other students, and eventually, the image had been sent to the cell phones of hundreds of 
students at multiple schools in the area, leading to taunts and insults directed at Logan. Id. Humiliated, Logan 
committed suicide. Id. 
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31% have received such an image.30 Tellingly, 29% report that they have had a 
sexted image shared with them knowing the material was intended to stay 
between the sender and the original recipient.31 
School administrators’ interests in searching the contents of students’ cell 
phones commonly involve the use of these devices as instruments of 
cyberbullying.32 The most frequent modes of cyberbullying—including phone 
calls, text messages,33 instant-message conversations, e-mails, and social 
networking websites34—can be and are perpetrated via cell phones, and thanks 
to the increasing sophistication of cell phone technology, the evidence of 
cyberbullying through these methods can typically (and even exclusively) be 
accessed by searching these devices’ stored content or using the devices to 
access the owners’ personal Internet data.35 In response to incidents of 
cyberbullying, school officials often need to search the content accessible 
through students’ cell phones.36 
 
 30 Sex and Tech: Results from a Survey of Teens and Young Adults, NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN 
& UNPLANNED PREGNANCY 11, http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/sextech/PDF/SexTech_Summary.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 13, 2011). These figures are even greater in the context of sexually suggestive messages, 
such as instant messages or text messages; 38% of students reported sending such messages, and nearly half 
(48%) reported having received such messages. Id. 
 31 Id. Again, the figure is higher in the context of sexually suggestive messages, as 39% reported 
receiving such messages despite knowing the message had originally been private. Id. 
 32 See sources cited supra note 21. 
 33 See Amanda Lenhart, Cyberbullying 2010: What the Research Tells Us, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE 
PROJECT (May 6, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/Presentations/2010/May/Cyberbullying-2010.aspx. 
 34 See MARCI FELDMAN HERTZ & CORINNE DAVID-FERDON, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND YOUTH VIOLENCE 7 (2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
violenceprevention/pdf/EA-brief-a.pdf. 
 35 This Comment does not address the question of whether third parties, including recipients of messages 
or e-mails, can reveal this information to school officials against the sender’s wishes; this Comment confronts 
only the question of whether a school official can search the cell phone of the sender. The Fourth Amendment 
likely provides no protection when the recipient of a communication reveals its content. See United States v. 
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information 
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed 
on the assumption that . . . the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”). 
 36 A recent anecdote illustrates the point. In early 2010, two Florida students engaged in a heated text-
message exchange that led to a violent physical altercation. See Laura C. Morel, Beaten Deerfield Beach Teen 
Josie Lou Ratley Recovering at Home, MIAMI HERALD, June 2, 2010, at B3. The evidence of the students’ 
exchange was exclusively accessible by reviewing the stored messages on each student’s cell phone. See id. 
The need is particularly acute and sensitive in the context of sexting, where students use their cell phones to 
produce, store, and send extremely private communications or photos, thereby requiring a review of the cell 
phone’s contents in the course of any investigation into the conduct, which often constitutes a violation of 
school rules. See, e.g., Scott Burton, Kelso School District Bans Sexting, KGW.COM (Feb. 8, 2011, 6:06 PM), 
http://www.kgw.com/news/local/Kelso-School-District-Bans-Sexting-115539049.html. 
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Many school districts have proposed controversial policies regarding cell 
phone searches that reflect this need to investigate cyberbullying incidents, 
emphasizing the timely importance of the question this Comment addresses. 
Before the 2010–2011 school year, for example, a Washington school district 
proposed a policy allowing school principals to search cell phone contents 
“when they suspect students may be using their phones to harass others via e-
mail, text message or by sending photos,” activities that constitute violations of 
school rules.37 Similarly, a Florida school district adopted new 2011–2012 
handbook language holding students “responsible for any inappropriate, 
immoral, unethical, dangerous, destructive, hateful or threatening behavior” 
committed through “a technological device.”38 
Of course, the need to investigate cyberbullying does not exhaust the list of 
reasons school officials have for searching students’ cell phones. Cell phones 
may be involved in the violation of any number of school rules or policies, 
including theft of the cell phone itself, use of the cell phone to call or text other 
students when such activity is prohibited (during class, for example), or use of 
the cell phone’s communication or photo functions to help others cheat on 
examinations.39 Moreover, the text messages, stored photos, or other stored 
files on or accessible from cell phones could constitute evidence of darker 
social ills like drug possession, use, or dealing.40 
As this Comment will explore, school officials’ searches of cell phones will 
inevitably give rise to Fourth Amendment concerns due to the personal (and 
often extremely private) nature of the contents of the cell phone that is the 
subject of the search, and the resultant controversy has produced uncertainty as 
students worry about their privacy and school officials fret over argumentative 
parents and potential lawsuits. The following section explores a model case to 
illustrate the scenario commonly facing schools and provide a basis for 
analyzing the Fourth Amendment issues involved. 
 
 37 Whittenberg, supra note 2. 
 38 Freeman, supra note 20 (quoting SCH. DIST. OF PALM BEACH CNTY., FLA., STUDENT & FAMILY 
HANDBOOK 2011–2012, at 51 (2011), available at http://www.palmbeachschools.org/Students/handbook/ 
documents/2011-2012_Student_Handbook_Final_English_to_PRINT.pdf) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 39 See Bernard James, Legal Update: Safe Schools, Cell Phones, and the Fourth Amendment, 
PEPPERDINE U. SCH. L. (2009), http://law.pepperdine.edu/academics/faculty/publications/James-NASROCell 
PhoneLaw.pdf. 
 40 See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Aleman, No. 1:10-CR-29, 2010 WL 2635071, at *12 (E.D. Tex. June 
9, 2010) (recognizing cell phones as “tools of the drug trade”). 
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C. A Model Scenario41 
Chris Pupil, a junior at City High School, carries a cell phone with him 
(and often uses it) during school hours despite a City School District policy 
that prohibits cell phones. Pupil can use his cell phone, an iPhone 4, to call or 
text message his friends and acquaintances, as well as browse the Internet and 
check his e-mail account, hold instant-message conversations with others, and 
access his message inbox on Facebook.42 The iPhone also takes high-resolution 
photos and stores thousands of songs and videos.43 
Over the past month, Pupil and several friends have been playing pranks on 
another student in the school, John Student, by creating identical degrading 
text messages on each person’s cell phone and then sending them all at once 
during lunch hour. The clog of incoming text messages jams Student’s phone, 
and the device’s screen often remains frozen on whatever message Pupil and 
his friends decided to send that day unless Student removes his phone’s battery 
and reboots the device. Pupil and his friends have also found it humorous to 
surreptitiously take embarrassing photos of Student during the school day and 
then text them to Student days or weeks later. Though Student, a shy teenager 
with few friends, originally played along, the pranks are beginning to bother 
him. Student tells a friend about the situation. The friend suggests telling a 
faculty member at City High, but Student refuses to involve authorities. The 
friend takes matters into his own hands and tells Margaret Principal, City 
High’s assistant principal, that Student is being cyberbullied by students in the 
school, including Pupil. 
 
 41 This model scenario draws from several cases and situations involving school officials’ searches of 
students’ cell phones. See, e.g., Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622, 627 (E.D. Pa. 2006) 
(describing a search by a school official of a cell phone confiscated without any suspicion); Richard Hartsock, 
Note, Sext Ed.: Students’ Fourth Amendment Rights in a Technological Age, 37 N. KY. L. REV. 191, 204–07 
(2010) (analyzing a similar scenario to the model case presented here, but emphasizing sexting); Unmuth, 
supra note 2 (detailing a school official’s search of a student’s cell phone in response to a dispute involving 
electronic communication); Ito, supra note 2 (describing the confiscation and search of a cell phone); Parker-
Pope, supra note 2 (presenting psychologist Elizabeth Englander’s similar hypothetical involving a cell phone 
search in the context of a cyberbullying investigation); Whittenberg, supra note 2 (explaining a school policy 
allowing principals to search students’ cell phones based on a suspicion that the student has engaged in 
cyberbullying against another student in violation of school rules). The model presented here customizes the 
situation for analytical clarity throughout this Comment. 
 42 The “message” function of Facebook mirrors e-mail in that it allows private messages to be sent 
between one Facebook user and another, see The New Messages, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/about/ 
messages/?setup (last visited Sept. 13, 2011), as opposed to the more public “wall” function, which allows 
everyone who visits a particular personal website to see the message shared between the two users, see supra 
note 11. 
 43 See iPhone 4, supra note 13. 
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Principal begins her investigation of this alleged cyberbullying, which is 
specifically prohibited in school antibullying policies, by calling Pupil into her 
office, informing him of the allegations, and asking for his cell phone. Pupil 
denies the accusation and refuses to give Principal his phone, but he hands it 
over when Principal threatens to give him in-school suspension. Principal 
dismisses Pupil but keeps the cell phone in her possession. Principal, a 
technological neophyte, proceeds to examine the contents of the cell phone. 
She first turns it on, then after several clicks through many of the phone’s 
applications (happening upon several stored photos and notes), finally 
stumbles upon the text-message inbox. She scrolls through several hundred of 
the messages, finding some that were directed toward Student. In the process, 
she comes across a number of other messages, including one from Pupil’s 
father telling him private information regarding a family member, one from his 
mother saying that the family did not have enough money to send him on a 
spring-break trip with his friends, and one from Pupil’s girlfriend regarding an 
issue in their relationship. Hoping to find stored e-mails of Pupil’s 
cyberbullying activities directed at Student, Principal then accesses the Internet 
through his cell phone and enters his e-mail account (which Pupil’s cell phone 
automatically remains logged into). Principal finds no stored e-mails to Student 
but runs across an e-mail thread between Pupil and a friend making several 
disparaging remarks about faculty members at the school, including Principal 
herself. 
Later that day, Principal calls Pupil back into her office, returns the phone 
to him, and serves him a three-day in-school suspension based on the evidence 
found on his phone for violating City High’s antibullying policy. Principal also 
tells him she is personally offended by the remarks he made about her through 
e-mail and is reconsidering her earlier intention to recommend Pupil for 
several college scholarships. 
With the help of his parents, Pupil commences a lawsuit against Principal 
and City School District, alleging a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to 
be free from unreasonable searches and claiming monetary damages. 
Though this scenario may be somewhat extreme, versions of it happen 
often in public schools around the country,44 fueling increasingly frequent calls 
for a reexamination of the Fourth Amendment protections allowed to students, 
 
 44 See supra note 41. 
SPUNG GALLEYSFINAL 11/1/2011 1:10 PM 
124 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:111 
at least in their cell phones.45 To understand the problems with these 
protections, the next Part will review the current Fourth Amendment landscape 
for public schools and note the problems in applying established Fourth 
Amendment doctrine to cell phones. 
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE AND A NEW FRONTIER FOR THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT IN SCHOOLS 
In constructing the Fourth Amendment, the Founders had a central purpose 
in mind: to require law enforcement authorities to state specifically what they 
intended to seize or search and have sufficient evidence to justify the 
intrusion.46 While the concept of unjust invasions by state authorities had 
crystallized into the general words “unreasonable searches and seizures” in 
some early state constitutions,47 the Founders found the searches of a few 
specific places and objects particularly objectionable.48 Thus, while the 
finalized Fourth Amendment incorporated the broad “unreasonable” language, 
it clarified the places and objects the Founders had in mind: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.49 
Until the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court accordingly limited its 
Fourth Amendment analysis to these four enumerations and refused to 
recognize protection in items that did not fall squarely into those categories.50 
 
 45 See, e.g., School Administrators Violate Colorado Law, Constitutional Rights by Searching Students’ 
Text Messages, ACLU OF COLO. (Oct. 10, 2007), http://aclu-co.org/news/school-administrators-violate-
colorado-law-constitutional-rights-by-searching-students-text-mes. 
 46 See generally WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 
602–1791, at 602–13 (2009) (discussing early state delegations’ debates and decisions that influenced the 
language of the Fourth Amendment). 
 47 E.g., id. at 605–06 (quoting MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XIV) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 48 See id. at 607, 687–88, 691–97. 
 49 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphases added). 
 50 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463–66 (1928) (finding no Fourth Amendment 
protection in the phone wires outside an individual’s house because the wire did not qualify as any of the 
enumerated categories listed in the Fourth Amendment), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347 (1967). To be fair, it should be noted that the Court insinuated in several early cases that the Fourth 
Amendment could protect interests beyond a narrow definition of the expressed categories. See, e.g., Gouled v. 
United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921) (observing that the Fourth Amendment “should receive a liberal 
construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon . . . the rights secured” therein); Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) (arguing that the language of the Fourth Amendment “should be liberally 
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After prolonged wrestling with issues related to telephone-based 
communication, however, the Court in Katz v. United States finally determined 
that the spirit of the Fourth Amendment extended beyond these antiquated 
classifications and protected any object in which an individual expects a 
certain degree of privacy.51 This concept, known since as the “reasonable 
expectation of privacy,”52 protects objects or places in which an individual has 
a subjective belief in her personal privacy that society is “prepared to 
recognize as legitimate.”53 
As case law since Katz has clarified, the Fourth Amendment’s constraints 
are implicated only when government authorities conduct searches54 involving 
places in which the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.55 If 
such an expectation exists in the particular object searched, the question 
becomes whether the government official conducted the search in an 
unreasonable manner.56 In a typical case, if a particular search is found to 
implicate the Fourth Amendment, officials must demonstrate the 
reasonableness (and thus constitutionality) of the invasion by showing that 
they obtained, from a magistrate judge, a warrant that was supported by 
 
construed”). As the Olmstead Court asserted, however, these recommendations could not “justify enlargement 
of the language employed beyond the possible practical meaning of houses, persons, papers, and effects.” 277 
U.S. at 465. 
 51 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–52 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. . . . [W]hat [a 
person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”). 
 52 The phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy” was actually coined by Justice Harlan in his Katz 
concurring opinion, see id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring), and was officially adopted to describe the concept 
in later cases, see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (noting that the Fourth Amendment inquiry 
“normally embraces” Justice Harlan’s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis from Katz). 
 53 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984). 
 54 This Comment addresses searches, which are analytically distinct from seizures. See generally 1 JOHN 
WESLEY HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 1.7–.15, at 15–31 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing the different analyses for 
searches and seizures). As John Wesley Hall clarifies, “[s]earches and seizures are separate constitutional 
events” because while searches implicate a person’s privacy interests, seizures affect only possessory interests. 
Id. § 1.7, at 15. 
 55 See, e.g., Hudson, 468 U.S. at 530 (holding the Fourth Amendment inapplicable to a particular search 
because the subject of the search had no expectation of privacy in the given situation); see also Donald L. 
Beci, School Violence: Protecting Our Children and the Fourth Amendment, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 817, 825 
(1992) (“It is clear that the Fourth Amendment does not apply unless one has a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in what is being searched.”); Stillwagon, supra note 16, at 1185–86 (“It is important to remember that 
before reaching the issue of applicable exceptions to the warrant requirement, a court may find a search valid if 
there was not a reasonable expectation of privacy in the object, thus eliminating the initial need for a warrant 
altogether.”). 
 56 THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION § 1.2.1.2, at 8–9 
(2008). 
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probable cause that the search would turn up evidence of a crime.57 If they 
cannot make this required showing, the individual may vindicate her rights by 
suppressing the illegally obtained evidence58 and claiming monetary damages 
for the violation of her Fourth Amendment protections.59 The latter remedy is 
“[c]hief among” those available to public school students alleging such 
violations.60 
At times, however, the Supreme Court has found that the reasonableness 
command of the Fourth Amendment61 permits particularly defined exceptions 
to the warrant requirement, thus allowing government officials under certain 
circumstances to search protected interests without a warrant—and sometimes 
without probable cause.62 For example, the Court has recognized that a law 
enforcement officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment by conducting a 
warrantless search of an automobile if she has probable cause to search it and 
if obtaining a warrant would be impracticable due to the vehicle’s ability to 
move quickly away from the scene.63 As the next section will explain, the 
Court found that searches of students and their belongings by public school 
officials also constitute an exception to the typical Fourth Amendment 
safeguards. 
 
 57 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (stating that warrantless searches are 
presumptively unreasonable). Probable cause to justify a search “exists where ‘the facts and circumstances 
within their [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] 
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is 
being committed and that evidence bearing on that offense will be found in the place to be searched.” Safford 
Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009) (citation omitted) (quoting Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (alterations in original)). 
 58 In most cases, if a court finds that an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated, the 
evidence procured as a result of this violation becomes inadmissible at a criminal proceeding. See, e.g., United 
States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470 (1980) (excluding “any ‘fruits’ of a constitutional violation—whether such 
evidence be tangible, physical material actually seized in an illegal search, [or] items observed or words 
overheard in the course of the unlawful activity” (footnote omitted)); see also CLANCY, supra note 56, § 1.2.3, 
at 13. 
 59 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, defendants may recover monetary damages from or request injunctions 
against government entities that violated their Fourth Amendment rights. See CLANCY, supra note 56, § 13.8, 
at 654. 
 60 Beci, supra note 55, at 826; accord LAWRENCE F. ROSSOW & JACQUELINE A. STEFKOVICH, SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 53 (3d ed. 2006). Indeed, many Fourth Amendment cases involving 
public school officials have been founded upon § 1983 claims. See, e.g., Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2633. 
 61 The Court has acknowledged that “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” 
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (emphasis added). 
 62 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (observing that the presumptive rule on 
warrantless searches is subject to “specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”). 
 63 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). 
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A. New Jersey v. T.L.O.: A Balancing Act and a Standard for Public Schools 
The Fourth Amendment analysis of any search of students’ belongings by 
school officials begins with the Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in New Jersey 
v. T.L.O.64 
The T.L.O. Court considered the case of a high school student who claimed 
that her Fourth Amendment rights had been violated when her school’s 
assistant vice principal, Theodore Choplick, searched her purse. A faculty 
member had spotted the student smoking a cigarette in a school bathroom in 
violation of school rules and reported the student to Choplick.65 The student 
denied smoking in the bathroom, so Choplick asked to see the student’s 
purse.66 Inside the purse, Choplick found cigarettes, and upon removing them, 
he noticed a stack of “rolling papers” that he believed to be associated with 
marijuana use.67 Based on this finding, he searched further and found 
marijuana, a pipe, several dollar bills, an index card with a list of individuals 
who owed the student money, and two other notes that implicated her in 
dealing marijuana.68 Choplick notified the student’s mother and turned the 
evidence over to police.69 Before a New Jersey juvenile court, the student 
moved to exclude the evidence found in her purse because Choplick’s 
actions—first searching the purse itself for cigarettes, and then conducting a 
second search of the purse and its pockets for evidence of marijuana 
possession—violated her Fourth Amendment rights.70 The court denied the 
motion and found her delinquent.71 The student appealed the ruling in New 
Jersey state courts, and the New Jersey Supreme Court eventually held 
Choplick’s search unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment because 
it had been initiated without sufficient suspicion that a search of the student’s 
purse would turn up evidence of wrongdoing.72 
 
 64 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
 65 Id. at 328. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 329. 
 71 Id. at 329–30. 
 72 Id. at 330–31. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and deemed Choplick’s search 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.73 In doing so, the Court carved an 
exception to the warrant and probable cause requirement that still guides 
school officials’ searches of students’ belongings.74 
The reasonableness command of the Fourth Amendment is crucial to the 
reasoning of Justice White’s opinion for the majority. As White stated initially, 
the legality of any search depends “on the reasonableness, under all the 
circumstances, of the search.”75 Using a well-established balancing test 
typically employed to illuminate the opposing interests at stake,76 White 
evaluated students’ expectations of privacy in their belongings against school 
officials’ interests in searching through these belongings. On one hand, 
students retained “legitimate expectations of privacy” in their belongings at 
school,77 though as Justice White suggested and as his fellow justices in the 
majority made explicit, students’ privacy expectations were far lower than 
those of the general population, at least during the school day.78 On the other 
hand, Justice White acknowledged that school officials needed the relatively 
unencumbered ability to maintain “discipline in the classroom and on school 
grounds” in the unique environment of schools,79 expressing particular concern 
for “drug use and violent crime” among students.80 
With this balance between competing interests in mind, the Court decided 
that the Fourth Amendment allowed not only the elimination of the warrant 
requirement but also an abrogation of the typical probable cause requirement.81 
The warrant, Justice White reasoned, was “unsuited to the school 
environment” because “requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching 
a child suspected of an infraction of school rules . . . would unduly interfere 
with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed 
in the schools.”82 Furthermore, the relaxed privacy expectations of students 
 
 73 Id. at 333. The Court quickly dispensed with a threshold question in deciding that public school 
officials, although agents of state governments rather than the federal government, were still subject to the 
strictures of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 333–34. 
 74 See Jon M. Van Dyke, The Privacy Rights of Public School Students, 32 U. HAW. L. REV. 305, 305–06 
(2010) (noting the continuing application of the T.L.O. approach). 
 75 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (emphasis added). 
 76 Id. at 337 (citing Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967)). 
 77 Id. at 338–39. 
 78 Id. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 79 Id. at 339 (majority opinion). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 340–41. 
 82 Id. at 340. 
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and the pressures of the school setting demanded a reduction in the level of 
individualized suspicion (normally probable cause) needed to justify a 
search.83 
These typical requirements annulled, White established a two-pronged test 
for evaluating the reasonableness of school officials’ searches of students’ 
belongings.84 First, a school official’s search must be “justified at its 
inception,” meaning that the school official needs “reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence” of a violation of school rules 
or of criminal activity.85 Second, the search must be “reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference.”86 As White 
emphasized, the ultimate consideration here is whether “the measures adopted” 
by the school official to execute the search are “not excessively intrusive in 
light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”87 
White applied this standard of reduced Fourth Amendment protections to 
uphold the reasonableness of Choplick’s search. Because the student denied 
the offense for which she was accused, the presence of cigarettes in her purse 
would support the contrary eyewitness report of a faculty member; therefore, 
Choplick’s search was justified at its inception because he reasonably believed 
the search would turn up evidence of a violation of school rules.88 White then 
found that Choplick’s second search of the purse for marijuana paraphernalia 
did not extend beyond a reasonable scope.89 The discovery of rolling papers 
upon removing the cigarettes gave rise to the suspicion of a new, more serious 
infraction—possession of an illegal substance—and a complete search of the 
student’s purse, including the purse’s interior pockets, was therefore justified.90 
B. The Balancing Act Continued 
By 2002, the Supreme Court had twice recognized and confirmed students’ 
lowered expectations of privacy in addressing the constitutionality of drug-
testing programs conducted in public schools. In Vernonia School District 47J 
v. Acton, the Court upheld mandatory urinalysis testing of student athletes in 
 
 83 See id. at 340–41. 
 84 See id. at 341–43. 
 85 Id. at 341–42. 
 86 Id. at 341. 
 87 Id. at 342. 
 88 Id. at 345–46. 
 89 Id. at 347. 
 90 Id. 
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part because, per T.L.O., students—and student athletes in particular—retained 
lower privacy expectations than adults.91 The Court similarly approved of 
another drug-testing scheme in Board of Education v. Earls, where school 
officials tested all students who participated in school-sponsored 
extracurricular activities.92 While searches consisting of drug-testing 
programs93 are factually distinct and call for a separate line of analysis,94 Acton 
and Earls merit mention both for their recognition of students’ reduced 
expectations of privacy95 and for an additional factor the two cases consider: 
the degree of intrusion. In each case, the students were subjected to only 
“negligible”96 or “minimal[]”97 intrusions upon their already truncated privacy 
 
 91 515 U.S. 646, 654–57 (1995) (recognizing students’, and particularly student athletes’, reduced 
privacy expectations as the first of three factors for determining the constitutionality of a drug-testing scheme). 
 92 536 U.S. 822, 830–32 (2002) (recognizing the diminished privacy expectations of any student that 
participates in extracurricular activities as the first of three factors in analyzing the drug-testing program). 
 93 Any governmental action that invades an individual’s legitimate privacy expectations constitutes a 
“search” implicating Fourth Amendment protection, even if the particular invasion is not a search in the 
conventional sense. See CLANCY, supra note 56, § 1.2.1.1.1, at 4–5. 
 94 Indeed, the Court has formed a distinct cache of cases challenging programmatic intrusions upon 
privacy interests conducted without any individualized suspicion whatsoever. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 
419 (2004) (traffic checkpoint); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (drug-testing program); 
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (traffic checkpoint); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 
496 U.S. 444 (1990) (traffic checkpoint); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) 
(drug-testing program). Examples of these suspicionless searches are mandatory drug-testing programs like 
those promulgated by school officials in Acton and Earls. Notably, the suspicionless-search analysis—which 
considers the nature of the privacy interest, the degree of the challenged intrusion, and the character of the 
governmental need and the program’s effectiveness in meeting it, see Acton, 515 U.S. at 654, 658, 660—
stems, in large part, from the fringes of T.L.O. In particular, a footnote from the T.L.O. majority opinion 
recognizing that “the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of [individualized] suspicion,” 
469 U.S. at 342 n.8 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)) (internal quotation 
mark omitted), has provided fodder for cases justifying suspicionless searches in particular situations, see, e.g., 
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665 (recognizing the “longstanding principle” that individualized suspicion is not “an 
indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance” (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8)). 
Similarly, Justice Blackmun’s statement that reduced safeguards may be substituted for the warrant and 
probable cause requirement when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the 
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable,” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in 
the judgment), has been repeated by cases eliminating the warrant and probable cause requirement entirely, 
see, e.g., Earls, 536 U.S. at 829 (citing the “special needs” language to engage in a balancing inquiry and 
ultimately justify a drug-testing program conducted without a warrant or any individualized suspicion). 
 95 Importantly, neither Acton nor Earls goes as far to say that students’ expectations of privacy in general 
have been reduced from the level recognized in T.L.O. In fact, Justice Thomas, writing for the Earls majority, 
may not have been in the majority had he attempted to fully generalize the reduced expectation of privacy he 
attributed to students participating in extracurricular activities. Justice Breyer, who commanded the “critical 
fifth vote” in Earls, LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 10.11(c), at 529, emphasized in concurrence that he joined the 
majority and upheld the drug-testing program only because it “avoids subjecting the entire school to testing,” 
Earls, 536 U.S. at 841 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 96 Acton, 515 U.S. at 658. 
 97 Earls, 536 U.S. at 834. 
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expectations, and this determination played into each case’s ultimate holding. 
Though the “degree of intrusion” factor is somewhat specific to the drug-
testing analysis,98 the slight infringements in Acton and Earls present an 
intriguing juxtaposition with the intrusion in the Court’s most recent school-
search case, Safford Unified School District # 1 v. Redding.99 
In many respects, Redding involved a similar scenario to Choplick’s search 
in T.L.O. An eighth-grade student was called into the office of the school’s 
assistant principal, Kerry Wilson, after Wilson had received a report that the 
student was involved in the distribution of pills to other students in the 
school.100 The student denied any involvement in the alleged activity.101 
Wilson proceeded to search her backpack and outer clothing, and upon finding 
no evidence of any illegal substance, Wilson directed her to the nurse’s office 
for a further search.102 In the nurse’s office, the student was instructed to 
remove all her clothing except for her underwear, which again turned up no 
evidence of the suspected activity.103 The student described the search to her 
mother, who then sued the school district for a violation of the student’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.104 
In rejecting the reasonableness of Wilson’s search in Redding, the Supreme 
Court engaged in a fairly straightforward application of the two-pronged test 
set out in T.L.O.105 The Court first found that the search was justified at its 
inception due to the various indications giving rise to reasonable suspicion of 
the allegation that the student possessed drugs.106 The Court rejected the 
search, however, on the grounds that the search did not remain within a 
reasonable scope based on the objective of the search, violating the second 
T.L.O. prong.107 Essentially, due to the relatively weak power of the drugs 
Wilson believed she would find and the lack of any reason to believe the drugs 
were in the student’s undergarments, the school’s interest in searching the 
 
 98 See Acton, 515 U.S. at 658 (observing that the “character of the intrusion” is the second factor in the 
analysis of a drug-testing program’s constitutionality). 
 99 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009). 
 100 Id. at 2638. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. Redding was also asked to pull out her bra and underwear, revealing her breasts and pelvic area to 
some extent. Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 See id. at 2640–43. 
 106 See id. at 2641. 
 107 See id. at 2642. 
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student did not justify the intensely private nature of the intrusion.108 True to 
T.L.O., the Court once again measured the student’s privacy expectations and 
the degree of intrusion against the government interest at stake. This time, 
however, the Court found the government’s interest wanting. 
Justice White’s balancing inquiry pitting the student’s particular 
expectation of privacy against a school administrator’s interest in maintaining 
school order (or, as each of the cases in this section entail, in investigating drug 
possession or use) has carried through recent cases. The T.L.O. two-pronged 
test based on this balancing analysis still governs any suspicion-based school 
search109—including an administrator’s search through a student’s cell 
phone.110 
C. The Puzzling Question of Cell Phones and the Fourth Amendment 
Before analyzing the problems with the reduced T.L.O. standard in light of 
the emergence of cell phones in public schools, it should be recognized that the 
debate over the proper approach to these devices has begun in various other 
areas of Fourth Amendment doctrine in the past few years. While several 
courts have grappled with the question of how the Fourth Amendment should 
treat cell phones, the law is far from settled. This section briefly reviews the 
ways courts have analyzed cell phones in other Fourth Amendment contexts. 
As a starting point, it is clear that individuals enjoy a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their cell phones, and thus a search of those cell 
phones implicates Fourth Amendment concerns and requires a warrant based 
upon probable cause—unless, of course, one of the exceptions to the warrant 
requirement applies.111 The question has become, however, whether cell 
 
 108 See id. at 2642–43 (noting that “the content of the suspicion failed to match the degree of intrusion” 
because the suspected facts provided no “indication of danger to the students from the power of the drugs or 
their quantity, [or] any reason to suppose that [the student] was carrying pills in her underwear”). 
 109 Van Dyke, supra note 74, at 305–06. 
 110 See, e.g., Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622, 640–41 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (analyzing 
a cell phone search by a school official under the T.L.O. two-prong test). 
 111 See United States v. Cole, No. 1:09-CR-0412-ODE-RGV, 2010 WL 3210963, at *16 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 
11, 2010) (“Courts have recognized that individuals retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
information stored in their cell phones . . . .” (citing United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 
2007))); see also United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2007) (“A personal computer is often a 
repository for private information the computer’s owner does not intend to share with others. ‘[F]or most 
people, their computers are their most private spaces.” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 
Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1077 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting))); United States v. 
Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
stored on a personal computer). 
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phones (or similar devices, such as laptop computers) may be searched without 
full Fourth Amendment protections if an exception does apply.112 
Thus far, many courts have come down against demanding higher 
safeguards for searches of cell phones and similar devices. In United States v. 
Arnold, for example, the Ninth Circuit rejected a defendant’s argument that his 
laptop computer was entitled to greater protection than the border exception to 
the warrant requirement provided.113 Similarly, in United States v. Murphy, the 
Fourth Circuit disregarded the argument that cell phone searches require a 
warrant due to their increased storage capacity under the search-incident-to-
arrest exception,114 in part because it would be too troublesome for officers at 
the scene to discern the difference between cell phones with large storage 
capacities and those with smaller capacities.115 A litany of lower courts have 
fallen in line.116 
 
 112 See, e.g., United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1087–90 (10th Cir.) (discussing, without deciding, 
whether hard drives and a laptop could be searched and seized pursuant to the “automobile exception”), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1028 (2009); Finley, 477 F.3d at 259–60 (finding that an exception for searches incident to 
lawful arrests permitted an officer’s search of a cell phone’s contents). 
 113 533 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2008). Border searches are generally justified as a matter of what is 
essentially homeland security. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153 (2004) (reasoning that 
“[i]t is axiomatic that the United States, as sovereign, has the inherent authority to protect, and a paramount 
interest in protecting, its territorial integrity,” which justifies privacy intrusions without the typical safeguards 
at the border); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (“[S]earches made at the border . . . are 
reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border . . . .”). In Arnold, the Ninth Circuit noted 
the sovereignty justification for border searches and specifically rejected the idea that a laptop, due to its large 
storage capacity, fell into the border exception’s “particularly offensive” search category, which would have 
caused the search to be unreasonable. 533 F.3d at 1010. 
 114 552 F.3d 405, 411 (4th Cir. 2009); accord Finley, 477 F.3d at 259–60 (categorizing cell phones as 
containers searchable without a warrant when found on an individual’s person pursuant to a lawful arrest based 
upon probable cause); People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 507–09 (Cal. 2011) (refusing to recognize the argument 
that cell phones have tremendously large storage capacities and would be, therefore, categorically distinct from 
tangible containers in the search-incident-to-arrest context). The exception for searches incident to arrest 
upholds the reasonableness of searches of an individual’s person and immediate surroundings without a 
warrant, as long as the individual has been detained upon probable cause. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 
752, 762–63 (1969). This doctrine is based primarily on the need for officers to both preserve evidence and 
prevent harm to themselves by securing any weapons the arrestee might possess. See United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
 115 Murphy, 552 F.3d at 411. 
 116 See, e.g., United States v. Stringer, No. 10-05038-01-CR-SW-GAF, 2011 WL 3847026, at *8 (W.D. 
Mo. July 20, 2011) (concluding that cell phones may be searched without higher safeguards than those 
provided by the search-incident-to-arrest exception); United States v. Garcia-Aleman, No. 1:10-CR-29, 2010 
WL 2635071, at *12 (E.D. Tex. June 9, 2010) (“Recently, several district courts have held that officers may 
search the contents of a cell phone (just as it allows searches of closed containers) seized during a traffic stop 
as long as there is probable cause to believe the phone contained evidence of a crime.”); United States v. 
Valdez, No. 06-CR-336, 2008 WL 360548, at *2–4 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 8, 2008) (finding cell phones searchable 
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Some courts have determined, however, that cell phones are categorically 
and analytically distinct from the tangible objects envisioned by the cases that 
originally established the traditional Fourth Amendment exceptions. The Tenth 
Circuit, for example, reflected in dicta that “laptop computers, hard drives, 
flash drives or even cell phones” could very well deserve “preferred status” 
under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement due to their “unique 
ability to hold vast amounts of diverse personal information.”117 Likewise, the 
Ohio Supreme Court held the search of a lawfully arrested individual’s cell 
phone unreasonable due to the unique characteristics of the devices.118 Other 
courts have similarly upheld the analytically distinct nature of cell phones in 
various Fourth Amendment contexts.119 
While the young debate over the privacy implications of cell phones is 
worth recognizing, these cases provide only limited guidance in the public 
school context, as many courts have made clear to limit their analysis to the 
particularities of the exception in question.120 Though the issue is pressing, 
courts have not yet considered the validity of cell phone searches under the 
framework of the T.L.O. exception for public schools, the subject to which this 
Comment now turns. 
III.  QUESTIONING THE T.L.O. EXCEPTION IN THE CONTEXT OF CELL PHONES 
The ultimate effect of T.L.O. has been to except school officials from the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirement. As described 
above, Justice White based this exception, and the two-pronged standard that 
 
without a warrant under the search-incident-to-arrest exception); United States v. Curry, No. 07-100-P-H, 2008 
WL 219966, at *10 (D. Me. Jan. 23, 2008) (same). 
 117 Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1090 (dictum). The Supreme Court has held that if a law enforcement officer has 
probable cause to search an automobile, she does not violate the Fourth Amendment by conducting a 
warrantless search of that automobile due to the vehicle’s ability to move away from the scene. See United 
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (“If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, 
it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.”). 
 118 See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 952–55 (Ohio 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 102 (2010). 
 119 See, e.g., United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 
2007) (holding that cell phones provide a higher expectation of privacy than afforded under the search-
incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement due to the vast amounts of private information capable 
of being stored on them). 
 120 See United States v. Cole, No. 1:09-CR-0412-ODE-RGV, 2010 WL 3210963, at *17 n.24 (N.D. Ga. 
Aug. 11, 2010) (distinguishing cases that considered cell phone searches under the inventory and incident-to-
arrest exceptions to the warrant requirement because they were “not relevant . . . to the Court’s analysis of the 
independent automobile exception to the warrant requirement”); see also United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 
1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2008); Garcia-Aleman, 2010 WL 2635071, at *10 (analyzing cell phone searches under 
the search-incident-to-arrest exception); People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 506–07 (Cal. 2011) (same). 
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replaced the normal requirement, on a balancing act weighing students’ 
reduced expectations of privacy in their belongings at school against school 
officials’ needs to quell significant disruptions in a unique environment.121 
The T.L.O. standard equally applies to cell phone searches in public 
schools and would almost inevitably uphold a routine, suspicion-based search. 
Recall the scenario outlined in Part I.C, in which Chris Pupil sued City School 
District and Margaret Principal, the assistant principal at City High School, for 
violating his Fourth Amendment rights by searching the contents of his cell 
phone. The apparent outcome of Pupil v. City School District serves as an 
illustrative starting point for understanding the problems with the application 
of the T.L.O. standard to cell phones. 
A court hearing the case would dutifully apply the two-step analysis 
outlined in T.L.O. for analyzing searches of students’ belongings by school 
officials.122 Thus, the court would first consider whether Principal’s search of 
the phone was justified at its inception. In this case, Principal had heard a 
report from a reliable third party, a friend of John Student, that Pupil had acted 
in ways that violated school antibullying policies. Principal almost certainly 
had reasonable suspicion that a search of Pupil’s phone would turn up evidence 
of this violation. Accordingly, it is difficult to argue that Principal’s search was 
not justified from the beginning.123 
As for the reasonable-scope requirement, it is somewhat unclear how a 
court would find.124 It is easy to imagine, however, that a court in Pupil’s case 
would uphold the reasonableness of the search’s scope, despite that it involved 
reading several private text messages and e-mails stored on or accessible 
through the cell phone, as well as coming across some photos and notes. The 
T.L.O. Court upheld the search of a student’s purse, including an examination 
of the purse’s interior compartments and of a notecard and two notes found 
inside them, as within a reasonable scope because the places searched were 
broadly related to the objective of the search.125 Under this directive, it would 
 
 121 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 122 See, e.g., Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622, 640–41 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (applying 
the T.L.O. two-part test in determining whether a school official unconstitutionally searched through the 
contents of a student’s cell phone). 
 123 Cf. Hartsock, supra note 41, at 207–08 (applying T.L.O.’s reasonable suspicion prong in the same 
fashion to a similar problem). 
 124 To date, no court has answered the specific question of whether a school authority maintained a 
reasonable scope in the search of a cell phone. 
 125 See 469 U.S. 325, 347 (1985). 
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seem that a court would similarly uphold the reading of Pupil’s stored text 
messages and e-mails, and likely even the incidental viewing of his photos and 
notes, because Principal’s adopted measures for conducting the search—
looking through the stored contents accessible on the phone—were most likely 
reasonably related to the search’s objective of finding evidence of 
cyberbullying. This evidence could conceivably have been in the form of text 
messages, e-mails, photos, or other forms of communication; therefore, a 
search of the phone would reasonably—even necessarily—entail a search of 
several different storage locations. It is difficult to envision a counterargument 
that would rely on T.L.O.’s flexible definition of reasonable scope.126 
Thus, a court applying the T.L.O. two-part test would almost certainly 
uphold the constitutionality of Principal’s search. In doing so, however, the 
court would accept three fundamental assumptions of T.L.O.’s analysis that are 
crucial to justifying the minimal safeguards provided by this test—assumptions 
that cell phones arguably confound, tipping the balance in favor of increased 
safeguards to more effectively protect students. First, the T.L.O. Court assumed 
that students’ legitimate expectations of privacy could be lower in terms of the 
tangible items they brought into schools, an assumption challenged by the 
unique capabilities and characteristics of cell phones. Second, the Court 
assumed that school officials could actually limit their searches to tangible 
locations reasonably related to the search’s objectives. Cell phones, however, 
defy this assumption and destroy the effectiveness of the second T.L.O. prong 
in limiting the intrusion effected by the school official’s search. Finally, the 
Court contemplated imminent dangers associated with tangible objects that 
necessitated immediate investigations by school authorities. The dangers posed 
by cell phones, however, many times do not constitute such dire emergencies, 
decreasing the reasonableness of urgent measures in response. The ultimate 
 
 126 Arguably, a court could construe the second prong of the T.L.O. test narrowly to find Principal’s 
search unreasonable. A result rejecting the constitutionality of this kind of search, however, is highly unlikely 
given the deference courts typically allow to schools, see Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 
2633, 2643 (2009) (acknowledging that courts must always give a “high degree of deference . . . to the 
educator’s professional judgment”), and what many scholars have deemed a pro-school attitude in the courts, 
see Beci, supra note 55, at 844 (“In the school setting, the goal of enforcing public safety has dominated [the 
balance between students’ rights and school interests].”); James, supra note 39 (“[T]hose arguing against the 
validity of content searches of confiscated phones assume a heavy burden of persuasion because current 
judicial attitudes uphold school policies that are designed to uncover and prevent misconduct by 
students . . . .”). Ultimately, as Professor Mary Graw Leary has recognized, “[i]t would seem that the 
combination of the low standard in T.L.O. combined with the decreased privacy rights and understandings of 
privacy for these youth, may combine to allow access to vast amounts of personal data” in a cell phone search 
at school. Mary Graw Leary, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy for Youth in a Digital Age, 80 MISS. L.J. 
1035, 1088–89 (2011). 
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effect: Cell phone searches invade upon students’ expectations of privacy to a 
degree the schools’ interests cannot justify, and thus are unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment without greater safeguards. This Part will explore these 
three assumptions in turn. 
A. The Case for Heightened Privacy Expectations in Cell Phones in Public 
Schools 
One fundamental assumption Justice White made in reducing students’ 
Fourth Amendment protections is that students carried only tangible items with 
them to school. Indeed, the T.L.O. Court made clear the types of objects it had 
in mind. White recognized that students reasonably carried textbooks, car and 
house keys, money, and “the necessaries of personal hygiene and grooming,” 
as well as purses, wallets, and occasionally “highly personal items” like letters 
or diaries.127 In concurrence, Justice Blackmun hinted that the goal of search 
and seizure in public schools was to respond quickly to the distracting “havoc” 
caused by a “water pistol or peashooter” and their more dangerous 
counterparts.128 Implicit in the court’s conception of items on students’ persons 
during the school day was the assumption that the items and information 
students carried were necessarily limited—students could carry only a finite 
amount (based, perhaps, on the size of their backpacks), and these items were 
correspondingly limited in the information they conveyed about the particular 
student or that student’s associations, personal interests, or family life.129 
Considering items of this nature, Justice White felt comfortable recognizing a 
reduced expectation of privacy for students.130 
As this section argues, however, this assumption is challenged by the 
characteristics and capabilities of cell phones, ultimately increasing students’ 
privacy interests in these devices. 
 
 127 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339. 
 128 Id. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 129 Cf. Chelsea Oxton, Note, The Search Incident to Arrest Exception Plays Catch Up: Why Police May 
No Longer Search Cell Phones Incident to Arrest Without a Warrant, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1157, 1199 
(2010) (arguing that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement has been wrongly 
construed by many courts as allowing authorities to search the contents of cell phones, because the standard 
was created “with a world of tangible evidence in mind . . . before the widespread use of cell phones”). 
 130 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338–39. 
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1. The Capabilities and Characteristics of Students’ Cell Phones 
Courts131 and commentators132 are beginning to recognize that cell phones 
are simply different from the tangible objects that have thus far been subject to 
Fourth Amendment searches. As the Ohio Supreme Court recently 
acknowledged, for example, “there are legitimate concerns” with allowing 
searches of cell phones without the typical Fourth Amendment safeguards 
because these devices “allow for high-speed Internet access and are capable of 
storing tremendous amounts of private data.”133 Justice Werdegar on the 
California Supreme Court has also noted these concerns, writing that, while the 
Fourth Amendment has allowed for reduced safeguards in some contexts based 
on a balance of competing interests, “[t]oday, in the very different context of 
mobile phones and related devices, that balance must be newly evaluated.”134 
The argument encompasses two interwoven characteristics of cell phones. 
First, cell phones’ storage capacities for all kinds of files “dwarf[] that which 
can be carried on the person in a spatial container.”135 Second, the type of 
information contained on students’ cell phones is often more personal than 
anything students would have carried (or would have been able to carry) to 
school in tangible containers.136 
The quantity of information available to school administrators in searching 
students’ cell phones is vastly greater than that available in tangible objects 
like purses or backpacks. Even standard cell phones, which are somewhat less 
sophisticated than the popular iPhone, BlackBerry, or Droid models, are 
“capable of storing a wealth of digitized information” that could not have been 
found in any physical object carried by a student.137 With such a tremendous 
amount of varied information available on cell phones, the sheer number of 
privacy intrusions of which school administrators are capable increases when 
these officials conduct searches of the devices.138 To recall the model scenario, 
 
 131 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 102 (2010). 
 132 See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27, 40–
44 (2008). 
 133 Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 954. 
 134 People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 513 (Cal. 2011) (Werdegar, J., dissenting). 
 135 Id. at 516. 
 136 Cf. Gershowitz, supra note 132, at 41–42 (noting the capacity to hold text messages, call histories, 
pictures, e-mails, and potentially obscene videos). 
 137 See Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 954; Leary, supra note 126, at 1085–86. 
 138 See Leary, supra note 126, at 1085 (asserting that students’ expectations of privacy in their cell phones 
at school may be shifting because “the amount of information available to a school official engaged in [a 
search] has grown significantly”); Stillwagon, supra note 16, at 1199 (noting that cell phone searches “reveal 
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for example, in searching for evidence of cyberbullying on Pupil’s cell phone, 
Principal scrolled through several hundred of his text messages, read many of 
his e-mails, and viewed several personal photos and private notes.139 The 
amount of information accessible on the cell phone necessarily increases 
Pupil’s expectation of privacy; Pupil has a far greater amount of individual 
privacy interests in the phone that are potentially invaded by Principal’s search 
than he would have were Principal to search a tangible container like a 
backpack. 
Concomitant with the quantity of information cell phones can store is the 
personal nature of that information. Cell phones store records of conversations 
and communications between students, incredibly detailed high-resolution 
photos, and audio or video files.140 These methods allow students to “store 
highly personal information” and “record their most private thoughts and 
conversations on their cell phones,”141 sometimes in ways students could not 
have in their tangible purses and backpacks—particularly because cell phones 
allow students (and searching administrators) to access their Internet accounts 
and review their Internet activities.142 A search of a cell phone thus may reveal 
incredibly private e-mails, bank accounts, or privately held religious or 
political affiliations,143 as well as information regarding students’ personal 
relationships, sexual orientation, or medical records.144 Moreover, a cell phone 
search could reveal information about a student’s family members that would 
not have found its way into backpacks or purses—a privacy interest of 
particular importance given the often-close relationship between parents and 
school administrators in schools and in the community. Again using the model 
scenario as an example, Principal’s search of Pupil’s iPhone revealed several 
private e-mails (most of which Pupil would rather Principal not have seen due 
to their sensitive nature), as well as photos and notes indicating Pupil’s 
extracurricular activities, which he may not have wanted Principal to come 
across.145 Principal also discovered a text message from Pupil’s mother 
admitting a family financial situation; such information is often considered 
 
information from several aspects of the owner’s life” and should demand heightened Fourth Amendment 
protection in the absence of a warrant and probable cause requirement). 
 139 See supra Part I.C. 
 140 See Gershowitz, supra note 132, at 41–42. 
 141 People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 516 (Cal. 2011) (Werdegar, J., dissenting). 
 142 See Gershowitz, supra note 132, at 42; Mulligan, supra note 17, at 1576. 
 143 See Diaz, 244 P.3d at 513 (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (“Never before has it been possible to carry so 
much personal or business information in one’s pocket or purse.”). 
 144 See Gershowitz, supra note 132, at 44. 
 145 See supra Part I.C. 
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extremely private, and it is easy to imagine his mother’s embarrassment upon 
realizing that Principal was now privy to the circumstances, as well. 
The increased quantity and more personal quality of information stored on 
cell phones arguably should afford students a heightened legitimate 
expectation of privacy in their contents146 because a school officials’ search 
thereof necessarily entails an intrusion into a deeper and broader base of 
privacy interests than a search of a tangible object could have, and the privacy 
interests at stake are often more serious than the interests at stake in searching 
a mere purse or backpack.147 Indeed, as one commentator has argued, “a ‘look’ 
into a cell phone’s memory can reveal ‘a subjective picture’ of our life”148 to a 
far greater extent than previously imagined in the tangible objects students 
carried with them in T.L.O.’s time. Students should enjoy a correspondingly 
higher expectation of privacy in their phones than Justice White was willing to 
recognize in students’ belongings at school,149 particularly given what some 
suggest are schools’ duties to instill in students a respect for rights in a society 
increasingly driven by technology.150 
2. Cell Phones, Protected Speech, and Heightened Privacy Expectations 
The case for a higher expectation of privacy than currently afforded under 
the T.L.O. standard also encompasses expressive concerns embodied in the 
First Amendment. As courts have recognized, many of the communications 
students make on their electronic communication devices constitute expression 
protected by the First Amendment against governmental abridgement, 
particularly if the expression does not significantly affect the school 
environment (and therefore presumptively lies beyond school officials’ 
 
 146 See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009) (finding that cell phones’ “ability to store large 
amounts of private data gives their users a reasonable and justifiable expectation of a higher level of privacy in 
the information they contain”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 102 (2010). 
 147 See Stillwagon, supra note 16, at 1199. 
 148 Id. at 1201 (quoting Hilary Hylton, What Your Cell Knows About You, TIME (Aug. 15, 2007), 
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1653267,00.html) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 149 Cf. Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 955 (holding that “because a person has a high expectation of privacy in a cell 
phone’s contents, police must then obtain a warrant before intruding into the phone’s contents” under the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement). 
 150 See, e.g., Beci, supra note 55, at 833 (“Undoubtedly, the approaches tomorrow’s leaders will take 
toward the [Fourth A]mendment will be shaped by the lessons they learn as today’s school children. Students 
learn about the liberty, privacy, and security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment more through actions than 
words.” (footnote omitted)). 
SPUNG GALLEYSFINAL 11/1/2011 1:10 PM 
2011] FROM BACKPACKS TO BLACKBERRIES 141 
control).151 Indeed, cell phones often contain records of political conversations, 
religious activities, and other private communications, all of which constitute 
traditionally protected speech.152 The storage of this often-sensitive protected 
expression on students’ cell phones supports the argument that students enjoy a 
heightened expectation of privacy in the devices’ contents. 
Courts153 and scholars154 have often alluded to the traditional relationship 
between the First Amendment and the Fourth Amendment, arguing that the 
two provisions were designed at least to work together, if not directly 
complement each other. As the D.C. Circuit has recognized, the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted in part “to provide citizens with the privacy 
protection necessary for secure enjoyment of First Amendment liberties.”155 
The U.S. Supreme Court has also contemplated this relationship, at times 
suggesting that the presence of materials protected by the First Amendment 
gives rise to the need for rigorous, even heightened, Fourth Amendment 
protection. The Court has suggested that settings and materials falling under 
the protection of the First Amendment invoke the warrant requirement 
“because we examine what is ‘unreasonable’ [under the Fourth Amendment] in 
 
 151 See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 930–31 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (finding that a school district violated a student’s First Amendment rights when it disciplined the student 
for off-campus expression that did not work a substantial disruption in school); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. 
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (recognizing the “rather unremarkable 
proposition” that students’ speech originating outside the school is protected by the First Amendment unless it 
creates a substantial or foreseeable disruption in school); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48–50 (2d Cir. 
2008) (recognizing that students’ electronic speech, at least when it originates outside the school, may be 
protected by the First Amendment); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2007) (same); 
J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 863–67 (Pa. 2002) (same). The First Amendment provides, 
in relevant part, that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. 
 152 Notably, students’ speech that disrupts the school environment may not be protected by the First 
Amendment. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (“[C]onduct by the 
student, in class or out of it, which for any reason . . . materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial 
disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of 
freedom of speech.”). The issue here, however, is that cell phones will inevitably contain at least some 
protected speech that does not disrupt the school environment, and students will therefore almost always have 
First Amendment protection in at least some of the contents of their cell phones. See id. at 506 (“It can hardly 
be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at 
the schoolhouse gate.”). 
 153 See, e.g., Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504–06 (1973). 
 154 See, e.g., CLANCY, supra note 56, § 11.3.6.2, at 511; Mulligan, supra note 17, at 1587. 
 155 Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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the light of the values of freedom of expression [protected by the First].”156 
The theory, as Judge Kozinski has clarified, is that too low a standard under 
the Fourth Amendment for a governmental search of an object implicating 
protected expression would serve to “chill” the protected expression until the 
low standard has the effect of a governmental abridgement of speech, thus 
eviscerating the First Amendment’s freedoms.157 
Many commentators argue that this relationship between the amendments 
supports the idea that when a particular government agent’s search will turn up 
communications or speech-related documents constituting expression protected 
by the First Amendment, the government must then justify its search according 
to a heightened level of suspicion or a more exact degree of particularity.158 As 
Professor Akhil Amar has asserted, for example, the presence of First 
Amendment concerns in a search should give rise to “special Fourth 
Amendment safeguards” such as “heightened standards of justification prior to 
searching.”159 Similarly, Professor Daniel Solove has suggested that such 
concerns regarding the object or material to be searched (if the search falls into 
an exception to the warrant requirement) should be infused into the 
reasonableness balance that justifies the exception, such that the search’s 
reasonableness “must be determined not only by reference to the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test but also based on the extent to which First 
Amendment activities are implicated.”160 The idea that the presence of First 
Amendment materials may affect the reasonableness balance of a Fourth 
Amendment exception has some basis in Supreme Court precedent, as well. In 
Roaden v. Kentucky, for example, the Court acknowledged that a particular 
Fourth Amendment intrusion was unreasonable “because prior restraint of the 
 
 156 Roaden, 413 U.S. at 504; accord Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978) (“[P]rior 
cases . . . insist that the courts apply the warrant requirements with particular exactitude when First 
Amendment interests would be endangered by the search.”). 
 157 United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1018 (9th Cir. 2008) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge 
Kozinski observed that “[t]he Founding generation recognized that the seizure of private 
papers . . . undermines freedom of speech” and that “the chill on speech that would result from failing to 
protect personal correspondence” would “compel every one in self-defence to write even to his dearest friends 
with the cold and formal severity with which he would write to his wariest opponents.” Id. (quoting 2 JOSEPH 
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 626 (W. H. 
Lyon, Jr. ed., Little, Brown, & Co. 14th ed. 1918) (1836)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 158 See, e.g., Patrick P. Garlinger, Note, Privacy, Free Speech, and the Patriot Act: First and Fourth 
Amendment Limits on National Security Letters, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1105, 1145 (2009). 
 159 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 806 (1994). 
 160 Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 131 (2007). 
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right of expression . . . calls for a higher hurdle in the evaluation of 
reasonableness” of the intrusion in question.161 
While no consensus exists regarding exactly how the Fourth Amendment 
should provide extra safeguards for protected expression, many courts and 
scholars agree that First Amendment material should require a more 
scrupulous level of protection under the Fourth Amendment, at least when both 
the warrant and probable cause requirements are abrogated in a particular 
context.162 The argument applies easily to school searches of cell phones. 
Given that students’ cell phones contain tremendous amounts of more private 
expressive material than Justice White imagined, greater First Amendment 
protections are implicated against the chilling of students’ speech. When 
infused into the reasonableness balance struck in T.L.O., the presence of these 
First Amendment concerns support a higher expectation of privacy in students’ 
cell phones than has been previously recognized. Students learn that they have 
a constitutional right to express themselves,163 and it flouts reason to 
simultaneously teach this First Amendment protection and subject a primary 
vehicle for such expression—students’ cell phones—to so low a Fourth 
Amendment standard. 
 
 161 Roaden, 413 U.S. at 504 (emphasis added). In Roaden, the Court was addressing the seizure by law 
enforcement authorities of objects that constituted expressive material protected by the First Amendment. Id. 
at 503–04. 
 162 Notably, the Fourth Circuit has held that under the border exception to the Fourth Amendment 
requirements, the presence of First Amendment materials does not affect the analysis. See United States v. 
Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 2005). The court based its rejection of the First Amendment argument, 
however, on the particular justifications of the border exception (which include the need to maintain national 
security above almost any other competing concern). See id. Ickes also based its holding on a Supreme Court 
case, id. at 507 (citing New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 874 (1986)), in which the Court declined to 
give expressive material a higher standard than probable cause for warrant requirements, see P.J. Video, 475 
U.S. at 874. However, as one commentator has pointed out, “the Court has never held that the First 
Amendment could not force a heightening of Fourth Amendment protections that otherwise would fall below” 
the usual warrant and probable cause requirements. Garlinger, supra note 158, at 1144. 
 163 See J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 854 (Pa. 2002) (“[F]ree speech is of special value 
in the school setting. Schools offer a laboratory-like setting that encourages diverse thoughts.”); Patrick 
Richard McKinney II, Note, On the School Board’s Hit List: Community Involvement in Protecting the First 
and Fourth Amendment Rights of Public School Students, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1323, 1342 (2001) (“[T]he 
inculcative function of the school prepares students to become productive members of society. Inculcation 
involves passing on to students a set of norms, social and moral aims, [and] civic goals . . . .”). 
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3. The Question of School Regulation: Phone Bans and the Expectation of 
Privacy 
While students should enjoy a heightened expectation of privacy in their 
cell phones in schools, some argue that this expectation is erased—or, at the 
very least, reduced—by many school policies that prohibit cell phones from 
the premises during school hours.164 Pursuant to these policies, school 
administrators regularly confiscate cell phones on sight.165 These rules, the 
argument goes, thus reduce or eliminate students’ privacy expectations in their 
cell phones at school. 
Intuitively, this seems correct. If an object can be taken away simply for its 
use or open possession, then how can students enjoy any expectation of 
privacy in that object? This postulation, however, gives rise to the important 
distinction between the physical object of a cell phone and the contents therein. 
While students likely should expect very little privacy in the physical 
possession of their cell phones given school policies prohibiting it, the ability 
of a school administrator to physically take the phone does not destroy a 
student’s expectation that the cell phone’s contents remain private.166 Indeed, 
as a federal court has recently held, lawful confiscation of a cell phone 
pursuant to school rules did not justify the subsequent search of the cell 
phone’s contents under the Fourth Amendment.167 The violation of the 
school’s prohibition of cell phones did not diminish the student’s expectation 
of privacy in its contents.168 
Thus, school policies banning the mere possession or use of cell phones 
decrease students’ expectations of privacy in the cell phones themselves, but in 
a typical case, the confiscation of a cell phone pursuant to these policies has no 
logical connection to a search of the contents. 
Some school policies may also clarify, using T.L.O.’s language, that 
students’ cell phones are subject to search when an administrator has mere 
 
 164 See, e.g., Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (considering a 
school policy prohibiting cell phones from classrooms and allowing their confiscation if seen by school 
officials); Ito, supra note 2 (same). 
 165 See, e.g., Klump, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 630. 
 166 Cf. United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1089 (10th Cir.) (“[A] notable distinction may exist 
between authority to seize a computer and authority to search its contents.”), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1028 
(2009). 
 167 See Klump, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 640–41. 
 168 See id. 
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reasonable suspicion to do so.169 Arguably, under this type of policy, students 
should expect less privacy in the contents of their cell phones because the 
school has effectively given students “advance notice” that their devices’ 
contents can be searched.170 Indeed, in situations in which students are given 
such notice of decreased privacy, school officials have typically been justified 
in searching the areas about which notice was given.171 
The theory underlying these decreased privacy expectations, however, 
indicates why students retain a heightened expectation of privacy in their cell 
phones’ contents, regardless of the notice their schools give them. As Professor 
Wayne LaFave observes, if schools give students advance notice that lockers 
are subject to search when a particular student is suspected of violating school 
rules, students must expect reduced privacy in these lockers because the notice 
“provides the student with an opportunity to limit the effect of the intrusion by 
not keeping highly personal materials in the locker.”172 The same theory may 
apply to any other physical containers students can carry into school. In other 
words, the basis of a reduced expectation of privacy in certain objects at school 
is that students can somehow search-proof these items or leave particularly 
personal items at home to limit the intrusiveness of any potential search. 
The reasoning dissipates when applied to students’ cell phones. By their 
nature, cell phones are all-inclusive. Students do not carry a different phone 
into school with them than those they carry during other aspects of their lives, 
and they do not have any way of separating out the personal contents of a cell 
phone to avoid subjecting these materials to potential search. Commonly 
among students, to use a cell phone is to store large amounts of personal 
information on it. In the model scenario, for example, Pupil’s phone contained 
photos of his extracurricular activities, hundreds of texts unrelated to the 
suspicion for which it was searched, and several similar e-mails,173 all of which 
were inseparable from the phone itself. While students certainly could delete 
the personal contents of the phone (and on their e-mail accounts or Internet 
browser histories) before entering school doors or leave their phones at home, 
 
 169 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 20; Whittenberg, supra note 2. 
 170 Cf. LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 10.11(b), at 506–07 (noting that school policies providing “advance 
notice” of searches decrease students’ privacy expectations in lockers). 
 171 See William G. Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59 IOWA L. 
REV. 739, 765 (1974) (“[W]hen the balance between privacy and law enforcement interests is extremely close, 
a regulation giving the student advance notice of a possible search may tend to swing the balance away from 
the student’s interest in privacy.”). 
 172 LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 10.11(b), at 507. 
 173 See supra Part I.C. 
SPUNG GALLEYSFINAL 11/1/2011 1:10 PM 
146 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:111 
this seems an unreasonable price to pay considering the vital role cell phones 
now play in students’ personal, social, family, and extracurricular lives. 
Ultimately, school policies that give students notice of a lesser expectation 
of privacy in their cell phones wrongly assume that students can limit the 
information stored on the devices to that in which they are willing to give up 
their privacy expectations. As students cannot effectively search-proof their 
phones, however, these policies should do nothing to reduce students’ 
expectations of privacy in the contents thereon. 
4. Distinguishing Diaries 
It may also be contended that Justice White contemplated tangible items 
with the same type of privacy implications as cell phones by acknowledging 
that students may carry “photographs, letters, and diaries” with them in their 
purses or backpacks.174 Arguably, then, the privacy interests of cell phones are 
indistinguishable from the privacy interests considered in T.L.O.’s calculus, 
and students do not have any higher of an expectation of privacy in their cell 
phones than they would in these admittedly private, tangible objects. This 
argument is unconvincing, however, for two reasons. 
First, though Justice White contemplated in dicta these personal items in 
reducing privacy expectations, he distinguished these items from those that 
students had to carry by necessity. While “[s]tudents at a minimum must bring 
to school . . . supplies needed for their studies, . . . keys, money, and the 
necessaries of personal hygiene and grooming,” he wrote, “students may carry 
on their persons” the far more private items listed above.175 Implicit in this 
distinction is the idea that, should students choose to carry these non-necessary 
items, they must expect less privacy because they could have chosen to leave 
them at home and are effectively on notice that—by virtue of these items’ 
presence in school—administrators may search through them if justified 
according to the T.L.O. standard. As established above, however, a student 
cannot distinguish the private and non-private contents of her cell phone; mere 
“advance notice” should not reduce a student’s privacy expectations in these 
complicated, all-purpose devices. A cell phone renders a highly personal item 
(like a diary) indivisible from less personal information, and Justice White’s 
assumption of this separability should fail to justify a lowered expectation of 
privacy in today’s cell phones. 
 
 174 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985). 
 175 Id. (dictum) (emphases added). 
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Second, even accepting arguendo that Justice White’s mention of diaries 
refutes the heightened privacy students expect in the contents of their cell 
phones, the argument still ignores the concept that the quality of personal 
information cannot be separated from the quantity of such information on these 
devices in recognizing students’ heightened privacy expectations.176 The 
increased expectations are not based merely on the idea that the information 
stored on a cell phone is often of a more personal nature than that which could 
(or would) have been stored in tangible containers at school but also on the 
concurrent argument that there is simply a greater amount and variety of this 
kind of information accessible to a searching official. A diary is limited in 
capacity and use, whereas a cell phone combines the functions of a massive 
diary, an extensive photo album, a notebook containing thousands of records of 
communications, and a variety of other features. Students may expect a greater 
degree of privacy in the combination of these features because there are more 
privacy interests at stake than Justice White considered. 
B. The Impossibility of a Reasonable Scope 
The unique characteristics and capabilities of cell phones thus support a 
more robust expectation of privacy than T.L.O. allowed in contemplating the 
tangible objects students brought to school in 1985. These heightened 
expectations of privacy upset the delicate balance struck by Justice White and 
the T.L.O. majority, which considered only students’ purses and backpacks, 
and the types of contents that could reasonably be found therein. Cell phones 
also confound the T.L.O. balance in another way. This section argues that the 
increased sophistication of cell phone contents, functions, and interfaces 
potentially subjects students to a greater degree of intrusion upon their privacy 
expectations. 
As the previous section indicated, cell phones store a wide variety of 
personal information, most of which is generally accessible to an equal degree 
on the phone. As the Tenth Circuit has recognized in the analogous context of 
laptop computers, “Because computers can hold so much information touching 
on many different areas of a person’s life, there is a greater potential for the 
‘intermingling’ of documents and a consequent invasion of privacy when 
[government authorities] execute a search for evidence on a computer.”177 This 
 
 176 See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
 177 United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001); accord Leary, supra note 126, at 1085–86 
(noting that physical objects necessarily limit the scope of an invasion—as in T.L.O. and Redding, where the 
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heightened potential intrusion into the often-jumbled private contents of 
students’ cell phones becomes particularly acute in the hands of school 
administrators, who may be unfamiliar with the latest models and interfaces of 
cell phones and lack training in conducting such sophisticated searches. Thus, 
the potential is high that school officials will come across an enormous amount 
of information, straying outside the reasonable-scope command of T.L.O. and 
effecting an intrusion upon students’ privacy expectations far greater than 
intended. 
Indeed, in requiring school authorities to confine their search of students’ 
belongings to a reasonable scope,178 the T.L.O. Court assumed that school 
officials were in fact capable of doing so. As a practical matter, however, it 
may be unreasonable to expect that administrators can navigate through an 
iPhone’s contents to locate incriminating evidence without viewing a wide 
swath of unrelated, highly personal items. The operation of cell phones, though 
often advertised as user-friendly, may be impossibly unfamiliar to those 
(undoubtedly including many school officials) who do not own the latest 
models or have not been trained to search them. In the model case, for 
example, Principal scrolled through hundreds of texts unrelated to the reasons 
for the investigation and unintentionally stumbled through various storage 
locations within the cell phone, simply out of lack of experience in using the 
iPhone’s interface.179 The T.L.O. Court, contemplating an obsolete era of 
tangible possessions, believed that school officials had the expertise (or at least 
the common-sense ability) to pick through the contents of students’ physical 
belongings and consciously limit the scope of their intrusions into students’ 
private places. The increasing complexity of cell phones renders this 
assumption untenable. 
The primary concern with the potential inability of school officials to 
confine a cell phone search to a reasonable scope is that it generally raises the 
degree of intrusion students are forced to accept. As the cases from T.L.O. to 
Redding suggest, the degree to which school officials will invade upon a 
students’ privacy throughout the course of a search, in addition to the pure 
privacy a student expects, may affect the calculus in a given case. In Acton and 
Earls, for example, the intrusion was “negligible”180 and “minimal[].”181 In 
 
intrusion was limited to items that could fit within a purse or backpack—in ways that content stored digitally 
cannot). 
 178 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. 
 179 See supra Part I.C. 
 180 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995). 
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Redding, on the other hand, the strip search was “degrading” and a far greater 
intrusion into the student’s privacy, as is any strip search.182 These holdings 
indicate that, when students are subject to greater intrusions upon their 
legitimate expectations of privacy, Fourth Amendment safeguards must be 
heightened in response. Indeed, as the Supreme Court noted in Redding, the 
particular intrusiveness of the strip search in question made it “categorically 
distinct, requiring distinct elements of justification on the part of school 
authorities.”183 If the government interest does not meet these more rigorous 
burdens to justify the search,184 then the search is unreasonable. In the case of 
cell phones, there is great potential for the invasion of multiple privacy 
interests unrelated to the objectives of the search. This potential supports the 
notion that higher Fourth Amendment standards should be imposed upon cell 
phone searches in the public school environment, given the amount of privacy 
interests at stake and the reduced standard that T.L.O. established.185 
C. Schools’ Insufficient Interests to Justify Cell Phone Searches 
Due to the unique characteristics of cell phones and the difficulty in 
conducting constitutional searches of them without higher and more 
particularized safeguards in place, students’ privacy interests in the contents of 
these devices against school officials’ searches are far stronger than Justice 
White recognized in T.L.O. That established, this section now looks to the 
opposite side of the T.L.O. balancing equation and argues that schools’ needs 
to search the contents of students’ cell phones no longer match the degree of 
intrusion upon these heightened expectations of privacy. 
As an initial point, while the T.L.O. majority based the reduced Fourth 
Amendment standard for justifying searches on the need for school officials to 
exercise discretion in preserving “order and a proper educational 
environment,”186 the opinion made clear the particular “ugly forms” of 
 
 181 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834 (2002). 
 182 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641–43 (2009). 
 183 Id. at 2643. 
 184 In Redding, the heightened burdens that school officials failed to meet seemed to be a higher—or at 
least more exact—degree of suspicion to justify the intrusiveness of requiring a student to undress to her 
underwear and expose the private parts of her body. See id. at 2641–43. 
 185 Cf. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding under the search-incident-to-
arrest exception to the warrant requirement that, when “officers come across relevant documents so 
intermingled with irrelevant documents that they cannot feasibly be sorted at the site,” higher safeguards are 
needed). 
 186 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985). 
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disciplinary problems about which it was truly concerned: drug use and violent 
crime.187 The Court thus indicated that the social problems allowing the 
school’s interest to match a student’s expectation of privacy involved tangible 
objects that, if not confiscated upon an immediate search of a student’s person 
or belongings, would continue to pose an imminent danger (or at least an 
illegal distraction) to the school.188 In the majority of cases in which a school 
official will need to search a student’s cell phone, however, the school official 
is not justified by the same immediate concerns because the digital files stored 
on cell phones simply do not pose an imminent tangible danger to other 
students or the school environment. In the model scenario, for example, 
Principal suspected that Pupil’s cell phone contained evidence of 
cyberbullying,189 an activity that may pose relational and emotional harm to 
the targeted student but certainly does not necessitate the same immediate 
search in which Principal would have had to engage if Pupil was suspected of 
possessing a gun or knife. When a school official’s highly intrusive search of a 
student is missing the threat of grave and imminent danger (or at least 
significant disruption) to other students or the school environment, the 
intrusion is difficult to justify.190 
Even accepting Justice White’s reasoning on its face and allowing that 
school officials must possess the discretion to quickly search students’ 
possessions to quell any significant disruptions to the school environment, the 
application to cell phones still fails to some extent because the confiscation of 
a cell phone arguably neutralizes any threat the phone may have to 
maintenance of school order. In many situations—for example, when a student 
observably uses the cell phone during class time—the student’s ability to use 
the phone in the offensive way ceases when the school official takes 
possession of the phone, and a search of the phone’s contents is not logically 
justified to maintain order in the school. 
 
 187 Id. 
 188 Justice Blackmun also expressed concern about water pistols and peashooters—or, more generally, 
about tangible items that could cause distractions in the classroom but did not necessarily constitute illegal and 
dangerous possessions like drugs or weapons. See id. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 189 See supra Part I.C. 
 190 See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642–43 (2009) (finding the school 
official’s search unjustified in part because the object of the search did not reasonably pose any “danger to the 
students”); see also LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 10.11, at 64 (4th ed. Supp. 2010) (noting that a factor missing 
from the facts in Redding was an indication of immediate danger from the power of the drugs that the student 
was suspected of possessing). 
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Realistically, of course, these two arguments may ignore some situations in 
which a school administrator is faced with searching a cell phone for evidence 
of drug activity, such as a few incriminating text messages, a photo of an item 
of drug paraphernalia, or perhaps a personal note stored on the phone listing 
individuals that owe money to the cell phone’s owner.191 Here, it seems, 
neither of the arguments posited above apply. As T.L.O. arguably emphasizes 
schools’ need to quell drug use, the school officials’ legitimate interests 
recognized in T.L.O. do not seem to be mitigated in a search of a cell phone’s 
contents for exactly that purpose. Moreover, searches for evidence of drugs, 
according to the T.L.O. majority, seemed a sufficient government purpose to 
justify an immediate intrusion of the baseline level of privacy expectations 
students maintain in their tangible belongings.192 Thus, it is difficult to argue 
that a school’s interests have diminished when searching cell phones for 
evidence of drug use, possession, or dealing. 
The fact that schools maintain an important interest in this situation, 
however, does not repair the damage cell phones work to the T.L.O. balance. 
While schools’ interests may not have decreased in investigating drug use, 
these interests have also not increased to match the heightened expectations of 
privacy students enjoy in their cell phones and the more significant intrusion 
upon those expectations that a search of the devices would entail. Indeed, the 
governmental interest in searching cell phones for evidence of drug activity is 
the same specific interest considered in T.L.O. Though this interest then 
exceeded students’ privacy expectations in their tangible belongings, thus 
justifying a standard far less than the normal Fourth Amendment requirements, 
the interest now falls short of the heightened privacy students expect in their 
cell phones, and the reduced Fourth Amendment standard remains inadequate 
to protect students’ altered privacy expectations in these devices. Ultimately, 
even in drug-investigation scenarios, schools’ interests do not justify the low 
standards established by the T.L.O. Court. The balance has changed, and the 
T.L.O. standard is insufficient to protect students’ rights.193 
 
 191 T.L.O. dealt with the tangible equivalent of these types of evidence. 469 U.S. at 328. 
 192 See id. at 339–43. 
 193 There may be instances in which schools, with reasonable suspicion, need to search cell phones for 
evidence of an extreme threat to school safety (for example, a stored photo of a pipe bomb hidden in the 
school). The proposition that this kind of circumstance tosses aside any careful balancing analysis and justifies 
a search based on sheer urgency is generally accepted. See, e.g., ACLU Applauds Boulder Valley School 
District’s Decision to Limit Searches of Students’ Cell Phone Text Messages, ACLU (Apr. 21, 2008), 
http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/aclu-applauds-boulder-valley-school-districts-decision-limit-
searches-student [hereinafter ACLU Applauds School District]. These imminent-threat situations may call for 
an exception to the argument that cell phones demand higher safeguards than currently provided under T.L.O. 
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IV.  PROTECTING STUDENTS’ RIGHTS: THE SEARCH FOR FEASIBLE SOLUTIONS 
To this point, this Comment has established that the T.L.O. calculus 
justifying the elimination of the warrant requirement and the abrogation of the 
probable cause requirement in school searches is insufficient to protect the 
privacy students reasonably expect in their cell phones against school officials’ 
intrusions. Thus, higher safeguards under the Fourth Amendment are needed to 
fully respect these rights.194 This Part explores possible solutions for raising 
safeguards and protecting students’ privacy expectations, beginning with the 
first that may come to mind: the reinstatement of the warrant requirement for 
school officials’ searches of cell phones. 
A. Reinstating the Warrant Requirement: An Infeasible Solution 
As a starting point, it may be posited that the way to repair the Fourth 
Amendment standard in schools is to reinstate the warrant requirement for cell 
phone searches. School officials would, under this suggestion, be required to 
request a warrant from a magistrate judge declaring the facts giving rise to 
sufficient individualized suspicion and stating, with particularity, the specific 
files that the cell phone search intends to turn up. While conceivable in theory, 
however, the imposition of a warrant requirement is highly impractical and 
would likely fail to protect students’ Fourth Amendment rights to any greater 
degree. 
First, T.L.O. makes clear that, regardless of the balancing inquiry, the 
warrant requirement is simply ill fit for school officials’ searches of students’ 
belongings. As Justice White conclusively stated, “[t]he warrant 
requirement . . . is unsuited to the school environment” because “requiring a 
teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction 
of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the 
maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the 
schools.”195 In the years since T.L.O., this categorical recognition of the 
infeasibility of the warrant requirement in schools has become entrenched.196 It 
 
 194 Notably, there may be some contention that any solution to the problem outlined in this Comment 
would essentially function as an “exception to the exception” and lead to a confusing array of standards 
depending on the type of object searched, as the door would be opened to further litigation offering various 
theories similar to the one advanced herein. This scenario is a possibility. The Supreme Court, however, has 
not hesitated to carve such an exception within the T.L.O. doctrine when the balancing act favors the student’s 
rights over the school’s interests. See Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633. 
 195 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340. 
 196 See LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 10.11(e), at 539. 
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is highly unlikely, even with the need for higher Fourth Amendment 
protections in cell phones, that any court, state legislature, or school board 
would even consider such an audacious measure. 
Furthermore, it is unclear exactly how a reinstatement of the warrant 
requirement would actually protect students’ privacy expectations in their cell 
phones. The purpose of the warrant has traditionally been recognized as 
twofold.197 First, a warrant “provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral 
magistrate, and thus ensures an objective determination whether an intrusion is 
justified in any given case.”198 Given the deference with which courts are 
typically required to treat school officials’ judgments,199 however, courts are 
quite likely to grant a warrant request in almost any situation—particularly if 
probable cause is not required to justify the search. Second, “[a] warrant 
assures the citizen that the intrusion is authorized by law, and that it is 
narrowly limited in its objectives and scope.”200 The logistical problems of 
navigating through the information contained in cell phones,201 however, 
conceivably erase the intended perception of legitimacy in the cell phone 
owner’s mind. If a school official cannot selectively pick through a cell 
phone’s contents without coming across any number of protected files or data, 
it is unclear how a warrant would assure any greater degree of particularity. 
B. Requiring Probable Cause in Cell Phone Searches 
As an alternative to the ill-fitting warrant requirement, courts could require 
administrators to articulate probable cause before engaging in any cell phone 
search—the official would have to know of “facts and circumstances,” based 
on “reasonably trustworthy information,” that are “sufficient in themselves to 
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that” the cell phone contains 
evidence of a violation of school rules or criminal law.202 
The virtue of requiring probable cause is that it forces the school official to 
justify the cell phone search on more than the amorphous reasonable suspicion 
test set out in T.L.O., thus ostensibly requiring a stronger, more articulated 
 
 197 See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967). 
 198 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 (1989) (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 
U.S. 1, 9 (1977)). 
 199 See supra note 126. 
 200 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622. 
 201 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 202 See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009) (quoting Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
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government interest to match the degree to which the search may intrude upon 
students’ privacy expectations. This higher safeguard, therefore, would better 
reflect the shift that cell phones have caused in the T.L.O. balancing equation. 
Moreover, courts are likely to find probable cause a more feasible safeguard 
than a warrant; unlike the warrant requirement, probable cause is not 
necessarily unsuited for the school environment. While T.L.O. rejected such a 
requirement for school administrators, it did so after determining that the 
school’s interest needed to meet only a heavily reduced expectation of 
privacy203 and did not—and perhaps could not—explain why the probable 
cause standard was inappropriate to the school environment in general.204 With 
a new evaluation of students’ privacy expectations, however, comes a new 
evaluation of the standard the government must meet to match them, and it is 
reasonable to believe that school officials (perhaps with training) could 
understand and apply the standard in justifying a cell phone search.205 
Arguably, however, probable cause still provides an unclear standard that 
may fail to protect students’ rights to any greater degree based, perhaps, on the 
willingness of school administrators to make the circumstances fit the standard. 
Indeed, LaFave has observed that, even in T.L.O., Choplick would likely have 
been able to justify the search under a probable cause standard.206 Consider 
again the model case.207 Principal had information from an ostensibly reliable 
source (a student in good standing at the school) that Pupil was sending 
harassing material to another student through the communication modes 
available on his iPhone. When asked, Pupil denied the accusations. Principal 
undoubtedly had reasonable suspicion to justify the search under T.L.O.208—
but if her legal judgment were ever questioned, it would be difficult to 
conclude that she did not have probable cause, as well. Principal had 
knowledge based on the reliable third-party report that was arguably sufficient 
 
 203 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–41 (1985). 
 204 See LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 10.11(b), at 498 (observing that T.L.O. “simply assume[d] that the 
‘school setting also requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a 
search,’” but “[t]he basis of this assumption is never explained” (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340)). 
 205 Indeed, some state courts have required probable cause under certain circumstances in the school 
environment. See, e.g., State v. Heirtzler, 789 A.2d 634, 640 (N.H. 2001) (holding that when “school officials 
agree to take on the mantle of criminal investigation and enforcement . . . they should be charged with abiding 
by the constitutional protections required in criminal investigations,” including probable cause); see also 
LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 10.11(b), at 511 (noting that the probable cause requirement remains in school 
searches if law enforcement officials are involved “in a significant way”). 
 206 LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 10.11(b), at 498. 
 207 See supra Part I.C. 
 208 See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text. 
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to justify a belief that Pupil had violated City High School’s antibullying 
policy. It is a close call, and as courts allow substantial deference to school 
officials’ decisions,209 Principal could argue that she was justified even under a 
higher standard. 
As the scenario demonstrates, it is unclear in which situations the probable 
cause standard would actually provide greater protection for students’ privacy 
expectations in their cell phones. While probable cause could repair the 
disparity between schools’ interests and students’ privacy expectations, the 
fact-intensive inquiry it requires and the deference inherent in courts’ 
evaluation of school officials’ decisions could often render probable cause an 
illusory safeguard. 
C. State Legislatures and School Boards 
Another potential solution calls upon state legislatures and school boards, 
rather than courts, to develop the necessary safeguards for respecting students’ 
privacy expectations, either under the Fourth Amendment or state 
constitutional or statutory equivalents.210 Arguably, because state legislatures 
and school boards are stitched into the fabric of local democratic processes, 
they are more familiar with school issues, and are therefore better able to 
recognize students’ heightened privacy expectations and provide higher 
standards for searches in response. As a result, the outcome of these local 
bodies’ deliberations in protecting students’ rights will be perceived as 
somewhat more legitimate than courts’ holdings on the matter, an aspect of 
school disciplinary programs that at least one Supreme Court Justice has 
identified as important to the analysis.211 Thus, state legislatures can mandate, 
and school boards can implement, the safeguards necessary to recognize the 
adjusted balance between students’ privacy expectations and schools’ interests. 
Some may question whether these governing bodies would incorporate the 
proper safeguards in schools. As Professor Adam Gershowitz has observed, 
state legislatures are typically loath to impede upon authorities’ discretion, 
 
 209 See supra note 126. 
 210 See Gershowitz, supra note 132, at 51 (suggesting that state legislatures play a role in limiting law 
enforcement officers’ discretion under the search-incident-to-arrest exception). 
 211 See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 841 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting the importance of 
the democratic process engaged in by the school board in cases of “close question[s] involving the 
interpretation of constitutional values”). 
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particularly in the area of law enforcement.212 Students’ privacy 
expectations—the protection of which is guaranteed as a matter of 
constitutional law—would potentially be compromised by school boards or 
state legislatures siding with school officials’ demands to maintain disciplinary 
flexibility. 
It may be equally true, however, that state legislators or school board 
members are better equipped than judges to understand the privacy concerns 
associated with cell phones.213 Often belonging to the cell-phone-owning 
demographic, these individuals may personally relate to the privacy interests 
inherent in cell phones,214 particularly for students. Moreover, school board 
members and state legislators are likely more responsive to worried parents,215 
who may be concerned about protecting the information on their students’ cell 
phones from prying school authorities.216 In fact, some state legislatures and 
school boards have thus far shown a willingness to accommodate the privacy 
concerns associated with cell phone searches by adapting their policies to 
reflect these issues. A Colorado school district, for example, recently imposed 
greater safeguards than reasonable suspicion in these searches in response to a 
groundswell of opposition to the searches based on the reduced T.L.O. standard 
alone.217 It may be that these bodies are more responsive than courts to the 
privacy expectations of their constituents and more capable of developing 
agreeable solutions to respect these rights in schools. 
D. The Requirement of Parental Consent 
A final solution that courts—or state legislatures and school boards, as 
discussed in the previous section—could consider to protect students’ privacy 
expectations involves requiring parental notification and consent before a 
school official can search a student’s cell phone. This safeguard would require 
 
 212 See Gershowitz, supra note 132, at 51 (“Legislatures are not typically in the business of limiting police 
officers’ ability to conduct criminal investigations.” (citing Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote 
Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the 
Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079 (1993))). 
 213 See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case 
for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 858–59 (2004) (noting that courts “cannot readily understand how the 
technologies may develop, cannot easily appreciate context, and often cannot even recognize whether the facts 
of the case before them raise privacy implications that happen to be typical or atypical,” and thus state 
legislatures should play a greater role in developing privacy safeguards for new technologies). 
 214 See Gershowitz, supra note 132, at 51–52. 
 215 See id. at 53 (noting the need to please constituents). 
 216 See Unmuth, supra note 2; Whittenberg, supra note 2. 
 217 See ACLU Applauds School District, supra note 193. 
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an administrator, when considering the search of a student’s cell phone, to first 
call the student’s parent or guardian (using school directory information and a 
school-provided phone) and describe the suspicion giving rise to the need to 
conduct a search. The administrator could then allow the parent to give consent 
for the search, object to the search generally, or specify the steps the 
administrator could take to limit the search to the intended areas. Indeed, the 
parent could even walk the administrator through the search either in person or 
over the phone, effectively limiting the intrusion into private areas of the phone 
not related to the object of the search. 
There are several benefits to this type of safeguard. As an initial matter, the 
policy recognizes that parents, in most situations, are the true owners of the 
cell phone and therefore are, as a matter of propriety, the individuals in the best 
position to sign off on a search through its contents. The policy also recognizes 
that a cell phone search is not just an intrusion upon the students’ privacy 
rights, but an intrusion upon the privacy expectations of the family to which 
the student belongs. 
In substance, moreover, justifying a search through parental consent relies 
not on the balancing process of pitting the students’ privacy against the 
school’s interest, but on the doctrine of in loco parentis; if the school has the 
permission of the parent to act as the parent, then it may ignore the student’s 
privacy expectations to the extent that the parent has specified, increasing the 
fluidity and effectiveness of the search.218 As mentioned above, involving the 
parent in the process may limit the degree of intrusion by providing greater 
particularity as to the places searched. Finally, involving the parent may serve 
to build trust between the school and its constituents, a necessary element of 
the inculcation function of the public education system. 
A major shortcoming here is what a school official may do if a parent 
wholly objects to the search. At this point, the official would need to justify the 
search using traditional Fourth Amendment principles, destroying the 
effectiveness of a parental consent requirement and still leaving a student in 
need of heightened Fourth Amendment protection against an administrator’s 
 
 218 The doctrine of in loco parentis posits that a parent may “delegate part of his parental authority . . . to 
the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who . . . then . . . has such a portion of the power of the parent 
committed to his charge.” LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 10.11(a), at 486 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *453). Cases following T.L.O., however, dismissed the doctrine’s full application to public 
schools. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (“In T.L.O., we rejected the notion 
that public schools . . . exercise only parental power over their students, which of course is not subject to 
constitutional constraints.” (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985))). 
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cell phone search. Thus, while a parental consent requirement could provide a 
partial solution, full respect for students’ increased expectations of privacy in 
their cell phones likely demands a more holistic program of safeguards. 
Another possible limitation on this safeguard is that a small percentage of 
students (typically those who are in their final year of secondary education) 
have reached the age of majority, thus calling into question whether parents 
can provide the necessary consent. It is likely, however, that parents can still 
serve this function if they retain the same degree of control over their adult 
student.219 That parents can still give consent is particularly evident if they own 
the cell phone and pay for the plan, as is often the case even after their student 
becomes a legal adult. 
CONCLUSION 
The troubling question of how cell phones fit into broad Fourth 
Amendment doctrine has been debated in the last few years. Some aspects of 
the argument advanced herein have been suggested, in somewhat scattershot 
fashion, in a relatively young body of case law and commentary addressing 
other exceptions to the typical Fourth Amendment requirement of a warrant 
and probable cause. While acknowledging some of these propositions, this 
Comment’s argument applies only to the untested particularities of the public 
school exception established in T.L.O. 
Thus, this Comment sets forth the argument that, in light of the 
characteristics and capabilities of students’ cell phones, the T.L.O. standard for 
guiding school officials’ searches under the Fourth Amendment fails to 
recognize students’ heightened expectations of privacy in the devices, the 
greater degree to which school officials can intrude upon these expectations, 
and the insufficiency of schools’ interests in justifying these intrusions. 
Therefore, higher safeguards, such as the articulation of probable cause, the 
requirement of parental notification and consent, or the development of more 




 219 See, e.g., United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 720–21 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that a parent had 
apparent authority to consent to the search of his 51-year-old son’s room when he did not pay rent, when the 
parent had unrestricted access to the bedroom, and where the parent paid for Internet access that his son used). 
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applied to better protect the privacy students expect in their cell phones as 
these devices pervade every aspect of students’ lives—including the hallways 
of public schools. 
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